Saturday, July 30, 2011

Paper Orphans - From Voices Of Women

The Adoption and Safe Families Act, (ASFA), was passed in 1997 by the US Congress. The purpose of this Bill was to protect children from lingering in foster care. In some cases children were literally being lost in foster care in some of America’s larger cities. The idea was to find permanent placement for children within a designated time frame. Attached to this movement of children would be financial incentives and bonuses to states for compliance with mandates. Thus, the Child Abuse Industry in America was now, subsidized by the Federal Government.

One would hope that ASFA would make our children safer, at lower risk for neglect, abuse, and lower numbers of children in foster care. This has not been the case! In my opinion the goals of ASFA have grossly failed! ASFA demands that the child welfare agency be responsible for ensuring the safety of children in out-of-home care. Yet, nationwide hundreds of children have died while in the care of “professional parents”.

The actual outcome of ASFA has been a higher number of children in foster care. There has been a massive increase in parental terminations, and adoptions of America’s children. The issue that needs to be pointed out here, is that not only are the parent’s rights to have a relationship with their children terminated, all family members are terminated from having a relationship with these children.

Who is really benefiting from ASFA? The professional parents (foster/adoptive parents), the contracted mental health care providers, the residential and treatment centers, the growing demand for more social workers being hired to handle the caseloads, etc. According to statistics from the National Child Protection Reform each child that is in the system generates an estimated residual economic development figure of $250,000.00 or more per year! This tells me that our children are being harvested as a subsidized cash crop. When the market numbers increase then dividends in the form of bonuses are paid to the states.

The children who are being protected from their parents, (who are rarely if ever charged under any criminal abuse or neglect statue) are going to age out of the system without an adequate education, little or no social skills, little or no work experience, disenfranchised from their families and communities, on psychotropic drugs. What future does that hold for them? What are the residual costs to the taxpayers going to be? Are we just grooming our youth for their eventual commitment to our prison systems?

All of the proceedings that take place (with the exception of the rare criminal abuse charges,) are done by Administrative proceedings under a veil of secrecy. There is no jury, no evidence, only hearsay of the Case Worker, no witnesses or open trail, because of “the child’s confidentiality”. I don’t know of one case where the child(ren) were present in court to testify. The parents are adjudicated and placed on the Nation Registry of Child Abusers. They lose their family. They are told by everyone who hears their story, “They can’t do that!” But the fact remains it was done, is being done and will continue to be done until American families stand together to demand that their Constitutional right to parent their children is restored, and that the child protection system be reformed. However, they don’t do that for fear they will some how suffer further consequences from the State. Or they believe the biggest lie…parents in America have all gone mad and only professional parents and social workers care about and are capable of loving these “poor” children!

I am not suggesting, nor do I believe that there are not children who are being abused. What I am saying is that thousands of children are being removed arbitrarily and without substantiated cause from their homes. Some of these families only needed services that could’ve been provided with the children still in the home. I would like to note that according to national statistics children in foster care are at much higher risk of sexual and physical abuse then in the home of their parents. Federal legislation provides a foundation for States by identifying a minimum set of acts or behaviors that define child abuse and neglect. The Federal Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA) (42 U.S.C.A. §5106g), as amended by the Keeping Children and Families Safe Act of 2003, defines child abuse and neglect as, at minimum:

Any recent act or failure to act on the part of a parent or caretaker which results in death, serious physical or emotional harm, sexual abuse or exploitation; or
An act or failure to act, which presents an imminent risk of serious harm.

After huge class action lawsuits were brought against 32 states, 30 of them reformed their child protection policies with great success in focusing on family preservation and in-home family services that reduced the cost to taxpayers and made children safer.

I know that most of you are thinking to yourself, “These parents have abused their children and are in denial, blaming the system.” According to the statistics filed with the Child Welfare League of America (www. cwla.org) prior to ASFA in 1998 there were 55 adoptions in South Dakota and no children waiting to be adopted, 5 years later there were 144 adoptions and a staggering 464 children waiting to be adopted. The state last year received an adoption bonus of $56,000.00 for adoptions over their baseline number. Residential foster care in 2000 cost taxpayers in $4,498,452.00. Two years later in 2002 that amount had increased to $17,212,505.00! Folks, this is about the money, not about protecting children! From 1996 to 2004 the federal budget increased in SD by 128.6% and the state budget by 53.0%! Did all the parents in SD just start going nuts on their children over that six-year period? I think not! I believe money and economic development in the newly subsidized child abuse industry increased these numbers.

South Dakota has a 9% total Native American population, according to the Governor’s Commission on the Indian Child Welfare Act. Yet more than 65% of the children removed from the home are Native American. I believe this number, is also motivated by funding and opportunity. South Dakota has a statue that allows the Secretary of Social Services to collect funding from the Department of Interior for the cost of their care. Thus, Indian children are worth double the money to the state. Even though this has been denied by DSS at Appropriations and Government Operation and Audit Committee meetings, I find it hard to believe that they would go to the trouble of having legislation drafted for such an action and not utilize it. (Chapter 28 SDCL)

In a recent Rapid City Journal article it stated that 81% of the children were taken for reasons of neglect. What the Social Workers view as neglect is arbitrary. Virtually anything can be used against parents to justify the interrogation of your children at schools by police officers, social workers and counselors to intimidate children, ask leading and open ended questions that are used to ultimately destroy the family. These children then are removed from the school without the knowledge of the parents and placed in foster care. Poverty and its effects are often confused with neglect. Instead of the state, social and community organizations helping these parents overcome the financial struggles they suffer their children they are ripped from their lives.

The Government does not exist for any other reason than to protect the interests of the individual. The Government has no rights, only powers and duties. There is no provision for this non-governmental action in our Constitution. In fact the Supreme Court of the United States has ruled at least fifteen times on the right of parents to raise own their children.

The state of South Dakota has statues that forbid the State, it’s officers or agent to violate the Constitution or US Supreme Court rulings. See SDCL 1-1A-1 and 1-1A-2. In Lehr vs. Robertson, 463 US 248,) The linkage between parental duty and parental right was stressed again in Prince v. Massachusetts ... The Court declared it a cardinal principle “that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.” In these cases, the Court has found that the relationship of love and duty in a recognized family unit is an interest in liberty entitled to Constitutional protection ... “State intervention to terminate such a relationship ... must be accomplished by procedures meeting the requisites of the Due Process Clause” Santosky v. Kramer .

America’s children are not safer. Families are not being honored as the most primary social structure of our culture. The very foundation of a child’s normal development is being disassembled by states. The States create the problem, than they are the solution. The States create orphans, than they are the adoption agency.


* THIS ARTICLE WILL BE FEATURED IN THE JAN/FEB 2007 ISSUE OF WELL NATIONS MAGAZINE www.wellnations.com

Source: http://www.freewebs.com/voiceofwomen/

$10 Million Settlement For Child Abused By Foster Parent Demonstrates Lapses In Oversight System

From the Child Injury Laws blog --

Posted by Jonathan Rosenfeld on April 25, 2011

A significant settlement in a foster care abuse lawsuit demonstrated the defects in regulatory system meant to protect vulnerable children and infants. The lawsuit was brought on behalf of a 5-year-old boy who was placed into the foster care system after his birth mother was deemed unfit to care for the baby by her family.

From the time the boy was placed in the custody of his foster mother, he was repeatedly physically abused by the woman. An ancillary criminal trial of the foster mother demonstrated that repeated episodes of physical abuse resulted in a permanent brain injury to the boy.

At issue in the civil lawsuit against the District of Columbia, was the poor judgment of the regulatory agency that was responsible for ensuring the safety and health of children placed into a foster care setting. In this case, the Child and Family Services Agency failed to identify tell-tale problems of abuse-- that if identified earlier--- could like have prevented the boy's brain damage.

Though the foster mother had difficulty caring for another child placed in her care and was forced to return the child to the the state agency, months later she was recruited to care for this child. Even after the child placed in a potentially troubled environment, the agency failed to conduct regular assessments of the child's situation.

According to court documents, a social worker who was responsible for supervising the boys transition to the family, made a visit just once in the first 43 days that the boy was placed into custody compared with the weekly visits stated in the agencies protocols.

Similarly, the woman was accepted for the foster care program despite the fact that her finances were so significantly strained that she relied on government subsidies to provide food for her family.

The boy’s brain damage will necessitate round-the-clock medical care and special accommodations to his families home to accommodate his physical needs. In order to ensure the the money from the settlement will last to provide this care, the judge overseeing the case has utilized a structured settlement arrangement.

I don't think there's a group more vulnerable to mistreatment than children placed in the foster care system. Many of the children who enter these programs already have a history of coming from troubled homes and deserve the assurance of not getting placed into another situation where they further put at risk.

Ensuring children get proper care in a foster care situation is an issue I feel passionate about. I plan on discussing how we can improve the foster care system in future Child Injury Law Blog entries.

Source: http://www.childinjurylaws.com/foster-care/10-million-settlement-for-child-abused-by-foster-parent-demonstrates-lapses-in-oversight-system/

Friday, July 29, 2011

Senator Nancy Schaefer Report On CPS Corruption

The View - Obese Kids & Foster Care

Interesting conversation on The View with Whoopi Goldberg firmly stating that NO child belongs in foster care.

County Seeks Help With Unfunded State Mandate

Thursday, July 28, 2011 7:01 am

by Peter Bodley
Managing Editor

Anoka County is hoping a federal grant will help pay the cost of an unfunded state mandate.

The Anoka County Board has authorized the submission of a federal grant application in an amount of $500,000 to improve service delivery in the child welfare system.

The grant, if successful, would be for five years, $100,000 each year, from Oct. 1, 2011 through Sept. 30, 2016.

In 2010 the Minnesota Legislature extended the time that foster children could remain in the system from 18 to 21 years old.

The legislative action also allowed foster children who left the system at 18 to return to foster care until they were 21 if they were unable to make it on their own.

According to Cindy Cesare, county manager for family and child services, the new law went into effect July 1, 2010, but the Legislature did not authorize any money to pay for it, leaving it up to the counties to fund.

Before the new law went into effect, Anoka County on occasion would continue foster care for teens until they reached the age of 19, Cesare said.

While the teens are in foster care, they are offered services paid for by the county to get them ready to live independently.

This includes monthly visits by a social worker, therapy where needed and teaching the teens independent living skills, Cesare said.

If approved, the federal grant would enable the county to enhance those services, according to Cesare.

A portion of the grant would go to the Emma B. Howe YMCA, Coon Rapids, for its youth transition services program, Cesare said.

“The money would allow YMCA to work with more youth through its transitional services,” she said.

If the federal money is received, the county human services division would also partner with the Anoka County Job Training Center to provide job training and counseling for 18- to 21-year-olds, as well as helping them in job searches, Cesare said.

Cesare anticipates hearing the fate of the county’s grant application later this summer, she said.

According to Bill Pinsonnault, county social services and mental health director, the grant money would enable the county to work with these young adults so that they can be successful living independently and don’t have to come back into the system.

In tandem with the grant application authorization, the county board also approved an amendment to the contract it has with the Emma B. Howe YMCA to increase the amount from $45,000 to $47,000 for youth transition services, effective May 1 through April 30, 2012.

SOURCE: http://abcnewspapers.com/2011/07/28/county-seeks-help-with-unfunded-state-mandate/

Medical Journal Argues for Foster Care of Obese Children

A provocative commentary authored by Dr David Ludwig in the Journal of the American Medical Association argues that parents of extremely obese children should lose custody for not controlling their kids' weight, generating both support and outrage.


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J.W. AND M.R.W. v. STATE OF UTAH

J.W. AND M.R.W. v. STATE OF UTAH

J.W. and M.R.W., individually and as parents, guardians and next friends of A.W. f/k/a/ A.M., a minor child and M.W. f/k/a/ K.C., a minor child, Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

STATE OF UTAH; UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES; ROBIN ARNOLD-WILLIAMS, individually and in her former capacity as Executive Director of the Utah State Department of Human Services; LISA-MICHELLE CHURCH, in her capacity as Executive Director of Utah State Department of Human Services; DIVISION OF CHILD AND FAMILY SERVICES; RICHARD ANDERSON, individually and in his capacity as Director of the Division of Child and Family Services; CAROLYN HANSEN, KOLYN TACY, and LAURIE ZUMBRUNNEN, individually and in their official capacities, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 10-4060.

United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.


July 27, 2011

S. Brook Millard of Wrona Law Firm, P.C., Draper, Utah, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Peggy E. Stone, Assistant Utah Attorney General (Mark L. Shurtleff, Utah Attorney General, with her on the brief), Salt Lake City, Utah, for Defendants-Appellees.

Before MURPHY, McKAY, and O'BRIEN, Circuit Judges.
-----------------------------------------

McKAY, Circuit Judge.

This case arises from an unfortunate situation of child-on-child abuse within the foster care system. Plaintiffs are a foster couple and their now-adopted foster children who allege they incurred injuries after an abusive foster child was placed in their home in August of 2002. In this § 1983 action, Plaintiffs raised several state and federal claims against the State of Utah and the various State employees and entities involved in placing this child in their home. The district court dismissed several of Plaintiffs' claims under Rule 12(b)(6) and granted summary judgment to Defendants on Plaintiffs' remaining federal claims. Plaintiffs' remaining state claims were then remanded to the state court for disposition. On appeal, Plaintiffs challenge the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of their negligence claims and the grant of summary judgment to the children's caseworker and her direct supervisor on Plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment due process claim.

BACKGROUND

While Plaintiffs J.W. and M.R.W. were in the process of adopting their five-year-old foster daughter, A.W., they were asked whether they would also be willing to accept infant M.W. and her six-year-old brother, W.C.C., as foster children. All three children had the same caseworker at Utah's Division of Child and Family Services. Plaintiffs allege the Division's records revealed that W.C.C. had a history of sexual abuse, sexual reactivity, and violence; however, Defendants failed to warn Plaintiffs of this history, although the children's caseworker did tell Plaintiffs that W.C.C. was being medically treated for ADHD, occasionally told lies, had exhibited some jealous behaviors, and had made some racist comments about a previous foster brother. Soon after W.C.C. was placed in the home, he began engaging in violent and sexual behavior towards A.W., causing her extensive and permanent psychological harm. Ten days following this placement, A.W.'s adoption was finalized. W.C.C. was removed from the home some months later, and M.W. was subsequently adopted into Plaintiffs' home. Plaintiffs allege A.W.'s abuse at the hands of W.C.C. caused her to later abuse M.W. in similar fashion.

Plaintiffs' complaint raised, inter alia, several state negligence claims against the State and its entities and a Fourteenth Amendment claim against the children's caseworker and her direct supervisor. The district court dismissed Plaintiffs' negligence claims based on Utah's Governmental Immunity Act, which provides immunity to the State when the alleged harm is caused by a third party's assault or battery. As for Plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment claim, the court held that the caseworker and her supervisor were entitled to qualified immunity because Plaintiffs had not shown a failure to exercise professional judgment on the part of the caseworker, nor had they shown any basis for holding the supervisor liable under § 1983. Plaintiffs challenge these decisions on appeal.

DISCUSSION

We review the district court's dismissal of Plaintiffs' negligence claims under Rule 12(b)(6) de novo. See MacArthur v. San Juan Cnty., 309 F.3d 1216, 1220 (10th Cir. 2002). We also review the district court's grant of summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds de novo, applying the same standard as the district court. See Lawmaster v. Ward, 125 F.3d 1341, 1346 (10th Cir. 1997).

We first consider the dismissal of Plaintiffs' negligence claims on governmental immunity grounds. Under Utah law, a three-step test determines whether the State retains immunity from suit. See Hoyer v. State, 212 P.3d 547, 553 (Utah 2009). This test considers "(1) whether the activity undertaken is a governmental function; (2) whether governmental immunity was waived for the particular activity; and (3) whether there is an exception to that waiver." Peck v. State, 191 P.3d 4, 7 (Utah 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). The parties agreed for purposes of the motion to dismiss that the State's blanket immunity had been waived, absent an exception, by Section 63G-7-301(4) of the Utah Code, which waives immunity for "any injury proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed within the scope of employment." Utah Code Ann. § 63-G-7-301(4). However, Defendants contend—and the district court agreed—that an applicable exception to that waiver was provided in the next subsection of the statute, which states that immunity is not waived under subsection 4 "if the injury arises out of, in connection with, or results from: . . . (b) assault, battery, . . . or violation of civil rights." Id. § 63G-7-301(5).

On appeal, Plaintiffs argue the district court erred in holding that this exception provided the State entities with immunity for the alleged harms caused by W.C.C. Plaintiffs argue that their complaint's allegations regarding W.C.C.'s young age and "mental impairments"1 were sufficient to create a fact issue as to whether his actions could be considered intentional torts. (Appellant's Opening Br. at 20.) However, we conclude that the district court correctly dismissed Plaintiffs' negligence claims based on the battery exception to Section 63-G-7-301's waiver of immunity.

Under Utah law, a battery is committed if (1) the actor deliberately makes a physical contact and (2) this contact is deemed harmful or offensive at law, regardless of whether the actor was aware of the harmful or offensive nature of the contact. See Wagner v. State, 122 P.3d 599, 603-04 (Utah 2005). Although W.C.C. may not have been aware of the harmful or offensive nature of his contact with A.W., the types of contacts alleged in Plaintiffs' complaint—repeated physical and sexual abuses—were of a deliberate nature, and they certainly fall within the definition of harmful or offensive contacts. See id. at 609 (explaining that "the law defines `harmful and offensive' with reference to the mores of polite society, and protects against invasions of bodily integrity perpetrated outside those bounds"); see also id. at 605 (explaining that the "actor need not appreciate that his contact is forbidden; he need only intend the contact, and the contact must, in fact, be forbidden").

We are not persuaded by Plaintiffs' argument that the Wagner test applies only to adults and that Utah requires a higher showing of intent for children. Plaintiffs argue that the Wagner court made clear that physical contacts from a young child will not be batteries per se. However, the court's reasoning—that certain contacts from very young children are not deemed offensive or harmful at law because reasonable people would consider these contacts to be normal and customary—relates only to the second prong of the test for battery and does not assist Plaintiffs' argument that Utah courts would require an additional intent element under the first prong of this test for physical contacts made by children. Nothing in Wagner suggests the Utah Supreme Court would find the violent physical and sexual attacks alleged in this case to be exempt from the definition of battery simply because they were committed by a six-year-old child who was being treated for ADHD. Nor are we persuaded by Plaintiffs' citation to the Restatement comment that "[a] child may be of such tender years that he has no awareness of these matters and is in fact incapable of the specific intent that is required." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 895I, cmt. b. We are not convinced Utah courts would interpret this comment to mean that a child, unlike an adult, must have the specific intent to harm or offend, and not just the specific intent to make a contact that will be objectively considered harmful or offensive at law. Like an adult having an epileptic fit, a very young child may not always be in control of his limbs and thus may make a physical contact without having the intent to do so. Cf. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 895J cmt. c, illus. 2. This does not suggest, however, that contacts initiated by children must satisfy an additional intent element in order to be considered intentional torts. We are also unpersuaded that the Utah Supreme Court's discussion of a significantly different legal standard in the insurance case of N.M. v. Daniel E., 175 P.3d 566 (Utah 2008), should inform our consideration of the appropriate standard to apply in an intentional tort case.

We are persuaded the Utah Supreme Court would apply the Wagner test to cases involving children as well as adults, and we conclude W.C.C.'s alleged conduct fell squarely within the definition of battery. We thus affirm the district court's dismissal of Plaintiffs' negligence claims on governmental immunity grounds under Section 63-G-7-301.

We turn now to the district court's grant of summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds to the children's caseworker and her direct supervisor on A.W. and M.W.'s Fourteenth Amendment due process claim.2 State officials are generally liable under the due process clause only for their own acts, and not for violence committed by others. See Uhlrig v. Harder, 64 F.3d 567, 572 (10th Cir. 1995). However, "there are two recognized . . . exceptions to this rule: (1) the special relationship doctrine; and (2) the `danger creation' theory." Id. In this case, Plaintiffs rely on the first exception, the special relationship doctrine. This doctrine applies "when the state assumes control over an individual sufficient to trigger an affirmative duty to provide protection to that individual." Id. Thus, the State owed A.W. and M.W. the affirmative duty of protection while they were in foster care. See Yvonne L. v. N.M. Dep't of Human Servs., 959 F.2d 883, 892-93 (10th Cir. 1992). Indeed, the constitutional right of foster children to be kept reasonably safe from harm has been clearly established since at least 1985. Id.

However, state officials will only be found to have violated this right if they "knew of the asserted danger to [foster children] or failed to exercise professional judgment with respect thereto, . . . and if an affirmative link to the injuries [the children] suffered can be shown." Id. at 890. The applicable standard, "`failure to exercise professional judgment,' requires more than mere negligence: it requires an abdication of such professional responsibility," and "[s]uch abdication must be sufficient to shock the conscience." Johnson v. Holmes, 455 F.3d 1133, 1143 (10th Cir. 2006).

Plaintiffs contend that the children's caseworker abdicated her professional responsibilities when she placed W.C.C. in Plaintiffs' home because she neither considered W.C.C.'s history nor deliberated on whether this placement would be in A.W. and M.W.'s best interests. However, the undisputed evidence in the record refutes these contentions. The record reflects that the caseworker knew of the children's histories and had observed their interactions, considered their safety, and received reports from Plaintiffs regarding W.C.C.'s pre-placement visits when she decided that this placement would be safe and appropriate for all involved. Plaintiffs have not demonstrated a factual dispute as to whether the caseworker actually made this decision following deliberation and consideration of the relevant facts, and they do not argue or cite to "particularized evidence" showing that this decision "was an impermissible deviation from professional judgment." Johnson, 455 F.3d at 1144. We therefore affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment to the caseworker on Plaintiffs' due process claim against her.

As for the caseworker's supervisor, the district court correctly concluded that Plaintiffs' claim was essentially one of negligent supervision, which is insufficient to support a § 1983 claim. See Woodward v. City of Worland, 977 F.2d 1392, 1400 (10th Cir. 1992). The undisputed evidence in the summary judgment record reflects that the supervisor was not responsible for the placement decision on which Plaintiffs' claim is premised. Plaintiffs have cited to no evidence that the supervisor personally participated or knowingly acquiesced in the alleged deprivations of Plaintiffs' constitutional rights, and thus the district court correctly held that Plaintiffs have not set forth a valid basis for finding the supervisor liable under § 1983. See id.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the district court's judgment is AFFIRMED.

Footnotes

1. In their complaint, Plaintiffs alleged that W.C.C. was being medically treated for Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder when he was placed with them and that he later received treatment at a day treatment program at Valley Mental Health and an in-patient program at Primary Children's Hospital. We are not persuaded, however, by Plaintiffs' assertion that these allegations created a factual dispute as to whether W.C.C.'s actions were conscious and deliberate. We see nothing in the complaint supporting Plaintiffs' contention that W.C.C.'s alleged mental problems were sufficiently severe that his actions could be found to have been purely autonomic.

2. It does not appear that J.W. and M.R.W. raised a Fourteenth Amendment claim against any Defendants. In any event, since these two Plaintiffs were not in the State's custody, they would be unable to succeed on the special relationship theory asserted in this case. See Uhlrig v. Harder, 64 F.3d 567, 572 (10th Cir. 1995).

The Bill Of Rights Under The US Constitution

The Bill of Rights: A Transcription

The Preamble to The Bill of Rights

Congress of the United States
begun and held at the City of New-York, on
Wednesday the fourth of March, one thousand seven hundred and eighty nine.

THE Conventions of a number of the States, having at the time of their adopting the Constitution, expressed a desire, in order to prevent misconstruction or abuse of its powers, that further declaratory and restrictive clauses should be added: And as extending the ground of public confidence in the Government, will best ensure the beneficent ends of its institution.

RESOLVED by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America, in Congress assembled, two thirds of both Houses concurring, that the following Articles be proposed to the Legislatures of the several States, as amendments to the Constitution of the United States, all, or any of which Articles, when ratified by three fourths of the said Legislatures, to be valid to all intents and purposes, as part of the said Constitution; viz.

ARTICLES in addition to, and Amendment of the Constitution of the United States of America, proposed by Congress, and ratified by the Legislatures of the several States, pursuant to the fifth Article of the original Constitution.

Note: The following text is a transcription of the first ten amendments to the Constitution in their original form. These amendments were ratified December 15, 1791, and form what is known as the "Bill of Rights."

Amendment I

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.

Amendment II

A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.

Amendment III

No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.

Amendment IV

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Amendment V

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.

Amendment VI

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.

Amendment VII

In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.

Amendment VIII

Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.

Amendment IX

The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.

Amendment X

The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.

AMENDMENT XI

Passed by Congress March 4, 1794. Ratified February 7, 1795.

Note: Article III, section 2, of the Constitution was modified by amendment 11.

The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.

AMENDMENT XII

Passed by Congress December 9, 1803. Ratified June 15, 1804.

Note: A portion of Article II, section 1 of the Constitution was superseded by the 12th amendment.

The Electors shall meet in their respective states and vote by ballot for President and Vice-President, one of whom, at least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same state with themselves; they shall name in their ballots the person voted for as President, and in distinct ballots the person voted for as Vice-President, and they shall make distinct lists of all persons voted for as President, and of all persons voted for as Vice-President, and of the number of votes for each, which lists they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of the government of the United States, directed to the President of the Senate; -- the President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the certificates and the votes shall then be counted; -- The person having the greatest number of votes for President, shall be the President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of Electors appointed; and if no person have such majority, then from the persons having the highest numbers not exceeding three on the list of those voted for as President, the House of Representatives shall choose immediately, by ballot, the President. But in choosing the President, the votes shall be taken by states, the representation from each state having one vote; a quorum for this purpose shall consist of a member or members from two-thirds of the states, and a majority of all the states shall be necessary to a choice. [And if the House of Representatives shall not choose a President whenever the right of choice shall devolve upon them, before the fourth day of March next following, then the Vice-President shall act as President, as in case of the death or other constitutional disability of the President. --]* The person having the greatest number of votes as Vice-President, shall be the Vice-President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of Electors appointed, and if no person have a majority, then from the two highest numbers on the list, the Senate shall choose the Vice-President; a quorum for the purpose shall consist of two-thirds of the whole number of Senators, and a majority of the whole number shall be necessary to a choice. But no person constitutionally ineligible to the office of President shall be eligible to that of Vice-President of the United States.

*Superseded by section 3 of the 20th amendment.

AMENDMENT XIII

Passed by Congress January 31, 1865. Ratified December 6, 1865.

Note: A portion of Article IV, section 2, of the Constitution was superseded by the 13th amendment.

Section 1.
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.

Section 2.
Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

AMENDMENT XIV

Passed by Congress June 13, 1866. Ratified July 9, 1868.

Note: Article I, section 2, of the Constitution was modified by section 2 of the 14th amendment.

Section 1.
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Section 2.
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age,* and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.

Section 3.
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and Vice-President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.

Section 4.
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void.

Section 5.
The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.

*Changed by section 1 of the 26th amendment.

AMENDMENT XV

Passed by Congress February 26, 1869. Ratified February 3, 1870.

Section 1.
The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude--

Section 2.
The Congress shall have the power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

AMENDMENT XVI

Passed by Congress July 2, 1909. Ratified February 3, 1913.

Note: Article I, section 9, of the Constitution was modified by amendment 16.

The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration.

AMENDMENT XVII

Passed by Congress May 13, 1912. Ratified April 8, 1913.

Note: Article I, section 3, of the Constitution was modified by the 17th amendment.

The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof, for six years; and each Senator shall have one vote. The electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures.

When vacancies happen in the representation of any State in the Senate, the executive authority of such State shall issue writs of election to fill such vacancies: Provided, That the legislature of any State may empower the executive thereof to make temporary appointments until the people fill the vacancies by election as the legislature may direct.

This amendment shall not be so construed as to affect the election or term of any Senator chosen before it becomes valid as part of the Constitution.

AMENDMENT XVIII

Passed by Congress December 18, 1917. Ratified January 16, 1919. Repealed by amendment 21.

Section 1.
After one year from the ratification of this article the manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation thereof into, or the exportation thereof from the United States and all territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof for beverage purposes is hereby prohibited.

Section 2.
The Congress and the several States shall have concurrent power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

Section 3.
This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of the several States, as provided in the Constitution, within seven years from the date of the submission hereof to the States by the Congress.

AMENDMENT XIX

Passed by Congress June 4, 1919. Ratified August 18, 1920.

The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.

Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

AMENDMENT XX

Passed by Congress March 2, 1932. Ratified January 23, 1933.

Note: Article I, section 4, of the Constitution was modified by section 2 of this amendment. In addition, a portion of the 12th amendment was superseded by section 3.

Section 1.
The terms of the President and the Vice President shall end at noon on the 20th day of January, and the terms of Senators and Representatives at noon on the 3d day of January, of the years in which such terms would have ended if this article had not been ratified; and the terms of their successors shall then begin.

Section 2.
The Congress shall assemble at least once in every year, and such meeting shall begin at noon on the 3d day of January, unless they shall by law appoint a different day.

Section 3.
If, at the time fixed for the beginning of the term of the President, the President elect shall have died, the Vice President elect shall become President. If a President shall not have been chosen before the time fixed for the beginning of his term, or if the President elect shall have failed to qualify, then the Vice President elect shall act as President until a President shall have qualified; and the Congress may by law provide for the case wherein neither a President elect nor a Vice President shall have qualified, declaring who shall then act as President, or the manner in which one who is to act shall be selected, and such person shall act accordingly until a President or Vice President shall have qualified.

Section 4.
The Congress may by law provide for the case of the death of any of the persons from whom the House of Representatives may choose a President whenever the right of choice shall have devolved upon them, and for the case of the death of any of the persons from whom the Senate may choose a Vice President whenever the right of choice shall have devolved upon them.

Section 5.
Sections 1 and 2 shall take effect on the 15th day of October following the ratification of this article.

Section 6.
This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States within seven years from the date of its submission.

AMENDMENT XXI

Passed by Congress February 20, 1933. Ratified December 5, 1933.

Section 1.
The eighteenth article of amendment to the Constitution of the United States is hereby repealed.

Section 2.
The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or Possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.

Section 3.
This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by conventions in the several States, as provided in the Constitution, within seven years from the date of the submission hereof to the States by the Congress.

AMENDMENT XXII

Passed by Congress March 21, 1947. Ratified February 27, 1951.

Section 1.
No person shall be elected to the office of the President more than twice, and no person who has held the office of President, or acted as President, for more than two years of a term to which some other person was elected President shall be elected to the office of President more than once. But this Article shall not apply to any person holding the office of President when this Article was proposed by Congress, and shall not prevent any person who may be holding the office of President, or acting as President, during the term within which this Article becomes operative from holding the office of President or acting as President during the remainder of such term.

Section 2.
This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States within seven years from the date of its submission to the States by the Congress.

AMENDMENT XXIII

Passed by Congress June 16, 1960. Ratified March 29, 1961.

Section 1.
The District constituting the seat of Government of the United States shall appoint in such manner as Congress may direct:

A number of electors of President and Vice President equal to the whole number of Senators and Representatives in Congress to which the District would be entitled if it were a State, but in no event more than the least populous State; they shall be in addition to those appointed by the States, but they shall be considered, for the purposes of the election of President and Vice President, to be electors appointed by a State; and they shall meet in the District and perform such duties as provided by the twelfth article of amendment.

Section 2.
The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

AMENDMENT XXIV

Passed by Congress August 27, 1962. Ratified January 23, 1964.

Section 1.
The right of citizens of the United States to vote in any primary or other election for President or Vice President, for electors for President or Vice President, or for Senator or Representative in Congress, shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any State by reason of failure to pay poll tax or other tax.

Section 2.
The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

AMENDMENT XXV

Passed by Congress July 6, 1965. Ratified February 10, 1967.

Note: Article II, section 1, of the Constitution was affected by the 25th amendment.

Section 1.
In case of the removal of the President from office or of his death or resignation, the Vice President shall become President.

Section 2.
Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of the Vice President, the President shall nominate a Vice President who shall take office upon confirmation by a majority vote of both Houses of Congress.

Section 3.
Whenever the President transmits to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice President as Acting President.

Section 4.
Whenever the Vice President and a majority of either the principal officers of the executive departments or of such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting President.

Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that no inability exists, he shall resume the powers and duties of his office unless the Vice President and a majority of either the principal officers of the executive department or of such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit within four days to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office. Thereupon Congress shall decide the issue, assembling within forty-eight hours for that purpose if not in session. If the Congress, within twenty-one days after receipt of the latter written declaration, or, if Congress is not in session, within twenty-one days after Congress is required to assemble, determines by two-thirds vote of both Houses that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President shall continue to discharge the same as Acting President; otherwise, the President shall resume the powers and duties of his office.

AMENDMENT XXVI

Passed by Congress March 23, 1971. Ratified July 1, 1971.

Note: Amendment 14, section 2, of the Constitution was modified by section 1 of the 26th amendment.

Section 1.
The right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of age.

Section 2.
The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

AMENDMENT XXVII

Originally proposed Sept. 25, 1789. Ratified May 7, 1992.

No law, varying the compensation for the services of the Senators and Representatives, shall take effect, until an election of representatives shall have intervened.

---------------------------------------------------------------
Note: The capitalization and punctuation in this version is from the enrolled original of the Joint Resolution of Congress proposing the Bill of Rights, which is on permanent display in the Rotunda of the National Archives Building, Washington, D.C.

SOURCE: http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/bill_of_rights_transcript.html

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