Nicholas Santos was arrested March 4 and has been charged with Sexual Assault of a Child and booked into the Dallas County Jail.
by Jennifer Shrum
DALLAS— Child Protective Services investigator Nicholas Santos has been arrested for sexual assault and has been booked into the Dallas County jail. CPS Public Information Officer Marissa Gonzales confirmed the arrest and said Nicholas Santos has been an investigator with CPS since 2006. The 34-year-old is charged with Sexual Assault of a Child; bond has been set at $25,000.
CPS issued this statement following the arrest:
"We have been notified by law enforcement that one of our employees, Nicholas Santos, has been arrested and charged with felony sexual assault. He is currently incarcerated. Mr. Santos has been suspended from his current job as CPS investigator,. He has been in that role since he joined the agency in March 2006. We are conducting an internal investigation. If we determine that these criminal charges are true, he will be fired immediately. There is no place in Child Protective Services for employees who betray the public's trust, or who take advantage of young people we are supposed to protect."
Source http://www.the33tv.com/news/kdaf-nicholas-santos-cps-sexual-assault-arrest-story,0,1632101.story
CPS corruption hurts and destroys families worldwide. Please use caution posting about CPS here or anyplace on the internet. For your protection, using your full, real name and precise location is not advised. CPS has eyes everywhere and CPS is notorious for taking what people say, twisting it, embellishing on it and then using it against them in CPS "investigations" and at court proceedings.
Showing posts with label child. Show all posts
Showing posts with label child. Show all posts
Wednesday, March 7, 2012
Saturday, January 14, 2012
Family grieves after child is taken by CPS - Arizona
by Kristine Harrington
PHOENIX -- They are the cases that tug at the heart, children torn away from their families because Child Protective Services (CPS) believes their living conditions to be unfit.
It's the struggle one Arizona family is trying to cope with right now, losing a young family member, and they say it isn't fair.
Devon Cone is 2 years old.
“Devon is very close to all of us, he's very close to his brothers,” said his aunt, Cari Cone. “We are a very close family. We have all these kids. They are all happy, every single one of them is happy.”
Devon's mom is a drug addict who lost custody of all her children. Her three older boys were all adopted by their maternal grandma years ago. Then came Devon, who turned 2 last week, but his grandma, Mary Boland, was denied Devon.
“I have not slept for days, I have not slept for days,” Boland said.
Cone said she would take him but being unemployed she said CPS denied her, too.
“They told me the reason why is that I don't have the money to take care of him so I said are you going to take my kids too because I don't have the money, but the CPS worker said no,” she said.
That's when Devon went to live with his uncle more than a year ago.
“That's who he thinks is his daddy,” Cone said.
And that's who would be his adoptive daddy, but CPS won't allow it and no one is sure why.
“They are using the excuse that Tracy, my father's ex-wife from 20 years ago, is a better fit,” Cone said. “ But she is in New Jersey.”
CPS will not comment on this case specifically but says family reunification is their goal, but it doesn't always work out.
“We want to look at a child as an individual. A child may not be a fit with the family. There may be someone else who's a better fit for the child,” said Deidre Calcoate, an adoption manager with CPS. “We would talk to the family and help them understand why the child was not placed with them.”
Whatever the reason, it is impossible for all these broken hearts to understand.
“I want my brother, I want my brother to stay with us,” cried one of Devon's brothers.
Of course, custody battles are always heartbreaking and costly. Still this family plans to fight and hopes to bring Devon home someday.
Source http://www.azfamily.com/news/Family-grieving-their-child-taken-by-CPS-137323248.html
PHOENIX -- They are the cases that tug at the heart, children torn away from their families because Child Protective Services (CPS) believes their living conditions to be unfit.
It's the struggle one Arizona family is trying to cope with right now, losing a young family member, and they say it isn't fair.
Devon Cone is 2 years old.
“Devon is very close to all of us, he's very close to his brothers,” said his aunt, Cari Cone. “We are a very close family. We have all these kids. They are all happy, every single one of them is happy.”
Devon's mom is a drug addict who lost custody of all her children. Her three older boys were all adopted by their maternal grandma years ago. Then came Devon, who turned 2 last week, but his grandma, Mary Boland, was denied Devon.
“I have not slept for days, I have not slept for days,” Boland said.
Cone said she would take him but being unemployed she said CPS denied her, too.
“They told me the reason why is that I don't have the money to take care of him so I said are you going to take my kids too because I don't have the money, but the CPS worker said no,” she said.
That's when Devon went to live with his uncle more than a year ago.
“That's who he thinks is his daddy,” Cone said.
And that's who would be his adoptive daddy, but CPS won't allow it and no one is sure why.
“They are using the excuse that Tracy, my father's ex-wife from 20 years ago, is a better fit,” Cone said. “ But she is in New Jersey.”
CPS will not comment on this case specifically but says family reunification is their goal, but it doesn't always work out.
“We want to look at a child as an individual. A child may not be a fit with the family. There may be someone else who's a better fit for the child,” said Deidre Calcoate, an adoption manager with CPS. “We would talk to the family and help them understand why the child was not placed with them.”
Whatever the reason, it is impossible for all these broken hearts to understand.
“I want my brother, I want my brother to stay with us,” cried one of Devon's brothers.
Of course, custody battles are always heartbreaking and costly. Still this family plans to fight and hopes to bring Devon home someday.
Source http://www.azfamily.com/news/Family-grieving-their-child-taken-by-CPS-137323248.html
Sunday, January 1, 2012
“They were just suspicious of me from the beginning” - Iowa
by Jennifer Hemmingsen
When Victor Rodgers heard that his baby had been born, he headed to the hospital.
Even though he and the child’s mother weren’t together anymore, he planned on being an involved dad.
It was February 2009 — five weeks before her due date — but his ex’s new boyfriend had beaten her so badly that doctors had to deliver the baby. That’s how the Iowa Department of Human Services got involved.
Rodgers wanted to take his daughter home with him, but the DHS worker said he would have to go through the agency. She placed the baby with a foster family.
It took three months for DHS to confirm Rodgers’ paternity. Again, he asked to take his daughter home. Instead, the agency allowed him to visit her. Twice a week. With supervision.
Even though Rodgers had no history of child abuse or neglect, DHS would make him jump through more than two years’ worth of hoops to prove he was good enough to keep her.
He’s not alone. A recent third-party analysis of Linn County DHS, conducted by the non-profit Center for the Study of Social Policy, cited a concerning, widespread confusion between child safety and the potential risk of future harm among Cedar Rapids child welfare workers. The confusion was further compounded by “stigma, labeling and negative inferences drawn based on a family’s history.”
The analysis noted a “culture of caution” that leads to excessive intervention, coercion and monitoring of families, particularly black families. It found “the child protection system and its partners intervened with some African-American families in extensive ways with no clear reason or rationale.”
As Rodgers, now 48, tells it: “They were just suspicious of me from the beginning.”
Over the next few months, DHS records show, Rodgers worked his way up from supervised to unsupervised visits, meeting every personal and parenting goal the agency laid out for him. In October 2009, he even had his girlfriend, Molly, who had an extensive history with DHS, move out of his apartment because his caseworker told him to.
Rodgers agreed to take his daughter, Karee, to a safe place and call police, if Molly or Karee’s mother showed up at his apartment. By December 2009, he was consistently having weekend-long visits with his child. Social workers would drop in unannounced twice a day just to monitor his care. Things were going fine.
By Jan. 13, 2010, DHS gave him full-time custody of Karee on a trial basis — the last step toward reunification.
That month, when Molly showed up at Rodgers’ place, he took Karee to his cousin’s house, in accordance with the safety plan.
Yet when police arrived, Molly told them she lived there, and it was Rodgers who was forced to leave. When he returned later that night, Molly stabbed him in the shoulder. The next day, a DHS worker showed up at Rodgers’ home with police, demanding Karee.
Rodgers refused to hand over the child without a court order. Instead, police stunned him with a Taser and took Karee. DHS moved him back to fully supervised visits.
Still, caseworkers were positive about his progress, noting that Rodgers had maintained stable housing, employment and school throughout the case. He had everything needed to care for Karee and was showing good parenting skills.
“Victor has been able to do what DHS wanted done and progress to getting Karee home,” a February 2010 note reads. “Victor is very conscientious in moving forward in his life for himself and Karee.
“Victor did a lot of things right in the incident with Molly in attempts to keep Karee safe, including removing her from the situation,” the caseworker wrote. “She was kept safe.”
Perplexingly, though, just a few lines later: “Victor needs to be able to show he can protect Karee.”
Rodgers had planned on moving back to Illinois to be close to his sister once he got custody of Karee. He never got the chance.
On May 10, 2010, police again found Molly at Rodgers’ apartment. The state filed a petition to terminate Rodgers’ rights.
Rodgers continued to visit his daughter, under supervision. The worker’s notes are poignant: “Victor was very appropriate.” … “Victor was calm and relaxed during the visit, but did seem to be sad when this worker took Karee to his vehicle and drove off.” … “Karee never wanted her dad to let go of her.” … “Karee was very content sleeping in her dad’s arms for the majority of the visit.”
At Rodgers’ termination hearing that August, the social worker testified she didn’t believe Rodgers ever would harm his child. She was just worried he wouldn’t be able to keep her safe.
On Nov. 16, 2010, Rodgers’ parental rights were terminated. He appealed. He lost.
Karee would later be adopted by an unrelated family.
“Still to this day, I don’t have an allegation of child abuse or child neglect or anything,” he said. “I’m a good parent. They said I did a great job.”
That wasn’t good enough for a system that demands parents not only prove they’ve kept their children safe but judges their fitness to parent and rights to their children based on a theoretical future harm.
Source http://thegazette.com/2011/12/31/they-were-just-suspicious-of-me-from-the-beginning/
When Victor Rodgers heard that his baby had been born, he headed to the hospital.
Even though he and the child’s mother weren’t together anymore, he planned on being an involved dad.
It was February 2009 — five weeks before her due date — but his ex’s new boyfriend had beaten her so badly that doctors had to deliver the baby. That’s how the Iowa Department of Human Services got involved.
Rodgers wanted to take his daughter home with him, but the DHS worker said he would have to go through the agency. She placed the baby with a foster family.
It took three months for DHS to confirm Rodgers’ paternity. Again, he asked to take his daughter home. Instead, the agency allowed him to visit her. Twice a week. With supervision.
Even though Rodgers had no history of child abuse or neglect, DHS would make him jump through more than two years’ worth of hoops to prove he was good enough to keep her.
He’s not alone. A recent third-party analysis of Linn County DHS, conducted by the non-profit Center for the Study of Social Policy, cited a concerning, widespread confusion between child safety and the potential risk of future harm among Cedar Rapids child welfare workers. The confusion was further compounded by “stigma, labeling and negative inferences drawn based on a family’s history.”
The analysis noted a “culture of caution” that leads to excessive intervention, coercion and monitoring of families, particularly black families. It found “the child protection system and its partners intervened with some African-American families in extensive ways with no clear reason or rationale.”
As Rodgers, now 48, tells it: “They were just suspicious of me from the beginning.”
Over the next few months, DHS records show, Rodgers worked his way up from supervised to unsupervised visits, meeting every personal and parenting goal the agency laid out for him. In October 2009, he even had his girlfriend, Molly, who had an extensive history with DHS, move out of his apartment because his caseworker told him to.
Rodgers agreed to take his daughter, Karee, to a safe place and call police, if Molly or Karee’s mother showed up at his apartment. By December 2009, he was consistently having weekend-long visits with his child. Social workers would drop in unannounced twice a day just to monitor his care. Things were going fine.
By Jan. 13, 2010, DHS gave him full-time custody of Karee on a trial basis — the last step toward reunification.
That month, when Molly showed up at Rodgers’ place, he took Karee to his cousin’s house, in accordance with the safety plan.
Yet when police arrived, Molly told them she lived there, and it was Rodgers who was forced to leave. When he returned later that night, Molly stabbed him in the shoulder. The next day, a DHS worker showed up at Rodgers’ home with police, demanding Karee.
Rodgers refused to hand over the child without a court order. Instead, police stunned him with a Taser and took Karee. DHS moved him back to fully supervised visits.
Still, caseworkers were positive about his progress, noting that Rodgers had maintained stable housing, employment and school throughout the case. He had everything needed to care for Karee and was showing good parenting skills.
“Victor has been able to do what DHS wanted done and progress to getting Karee home,” a February 2010 note reads. “Victor is very conscientious in moving forward in his life for himself and Karee.
“Victor did a lot of things right in the incident with Molly in attempts to keep Karee safe, including removing her from the situation,” the caseworker wrote. “She was kept safe.”
Perplexingly, though, just a few lines later: “Victor needs to be able to show he can protect Karee.”
Rodgers had planned on moving back to Illinois to be close to his sister once he got custody of Karee. He never got the chance.
On May 10, 2010, police again found Molly at Rodgers’ apartment. The state filed a petition to terminate Rodgers’ rights.
Rodgers continued to visit his daughter, under supervision. The worker’s notes are poignant: “Victor was very appropriate.” … “Victor was calm and relaxed during the visit, but did seem to be sad when this worker took Karee to his vehicle and drove off.” … “Karee never wanted her dad to let go of her.” … “Karee was very content sleeping in her dad’s arms for the majority of the visit.”
At Rodgers’ termination hearing that August, the social worker testified she didn’t believe Rodgers ever would harm his child. She was just worried he wouldn’t be able to keep her safe.
On Nov. 16, 2010, Rodgers’ parental rights were terminated. He appealed. He lost.
Karee would later be adopted by an unrelated family.
“Still to this day, I don’t have an allegation of child abuse or child neglect or anything,” he said. “I’m a good parent. They said I did a great job.”
That wasn’t good enough for a system that demands parents not only prove they’ve kept their children safe but judges their fitness to parent and rights to their children based on a theoretical future harm.
Source http://thegazette.com/2011/12/31/they-were-just-suspicious-of-me-from-the-beginning/
Monday, December 12, 2011
Judge sides with Godboldo, won't reinstate criminal charges
by Doug Guthrie
Detroit— Two judges in different Wayne County courtrooms sided Monday with a mother who resisted police forcing their way into her home last March to take her teenage daughter during a dispute with a Child Protective Services worker over medications.
A Family Court judge Monday afternoon accepted positive medical and education reports, and over the objections of an assistant state attorney general representing the Department of Health and Human Services, dismissed jurisdiction that had for nine months come between now 14-year-old Arianna Godboldo and her family.
Earlier Monday, a Wayne County Circuit judge refused to reinstate criminal charges, dismissed in August by a 36th District Court judge, that alleged the mother, Maryanne Godboldo, illegally resisted and assaulted police by allegedly firing a shot at them.
Family members hugged and issued thanks to the judges in both courtrooms, but authorities aren't done pursuing the Godboldos.
Wayne County Prosecutor Kym Worthy's office issued a statement Monday, vowing to make a third appeal to reinstate criminal charges.
And, Family Court Judge Lynne Pierce told Assistant Attorney General Deborah Carley, who complained it appears the girl has never received anything other than homeschooling her entire life, she is not barred from pursuing criminal truancy charges if she feels the parents are flouting state law that required the education of children.
"There may be some more evaluation to be done, but I don't see any more need of this court's continued involvement," Pierce said.
Wayne County Circuit Judge Gregory Bill ruled in the morning against claims by the prosecutor that 36th District Judge Ronald Giles committed judicial error in August when he threw out the criminal charges. Bill said Giles was correct in concluding there was insufficient evidence to order Godboldo to trial.
"It is clear to me that he (Giles) doesn't think the defendant shot at anybody," Bill said, concluding if a shot was fired inside the house, it was fired at the ceiling and perhaps not by the mother.
"Did the child get a hold of the gun? I don't know," Bill said. "There are so many statements that are conflicting evidence, and Judge Giles went out of his way to allow the prosecutor to clear this up."
Godboldo's lawyers have said all along this was about parental rights to make medical decisions on behalf of their children, and the government abused its authority in obtaining an order to take the child without a court hearing. They also said the improper action created a conflict with police that resulted in criminal charges.
"It is absurd," Godboldo lawyer Byron Pitts said about the possibility of another appeal. "Four different judges have said they believe this family did nothing wrong. This includes another District Court judge, Judge (Paula) Humphries, who ruled earlier on some matters. It has been clear to these judges that this all stems from one overzealous caseworker, and continued appeals now border on persecution."
Acting on a call from Wayne County Child Protective Services worker Mia Wenk — who told police she had obtained an order to remove the child on a claim of medical neglect — Detroit police officers on March 24 accused her of firing a handgun at them through a plaster wall after she refused to let them inside. It took hours to talk Godboldo out of the house. She was jailed for several days until her release on bond, and her daughter was held in a state psychiatric facility for almost two months.
Godboldo was charged with resisting and assaulting police, as well as use of a firearm in the commission of a felony. Giles tossed out the charges because he said the order used by police as authority to enter the house was invalid. It was never authorized by a judge, but had a rubber stamp signature. Police also testified they don't normally enforce civil court orders, but they had been told by the protective services worker it was a criminal warrant.
Bill said his opinion should not be considered as a criticism of Detroit police, but he raised questions about the behavior of the social worker, whom he described as "young." Bill hinted Wenk was impatient, filled out a legal order that was woefully inadequate, broke with established policy by calling 911 to have Detroit police enforce it rather then confront the woman herself, and then misrepresented the meaning of the order to police.
Pierce had ruled in September against the government's claims the mother had committed medical abuse by withholding a controversial anti-psychotic medication. The girl was being treated for a sudden onset of psychotic behavior the mother believes was caused by a bad reaction to immunizations.
Pierce determined Godboldo was within her rights to terminate the voluntary treatment program. The judge ordered the girl returned to the mother's home Sept. 29. A hearing to finalize the juvenile case also is scheduled for later Monday.
Godboldo said Monday she and her daughter had a difficult Sunday night because of heightened anxiety over the coming hearing. She said she hopes authorities will this time accept a judge's assessment of the situation and not appeal again.
"I hope they understand they are affecting people's lives," she said. "They should know of the damage they have done to my daughter because they broke the law."
Godboldo said her daughter had been doing better, but she was continuing to be home schooled because psychiatric troubles continue that she attributes to "effects from the immunizations." She said the girl, who wears a prosthetic leg, continues to enjoy studying dance and music, and playing her conga drums.
"She is coming along," Godboldo said. "She is doing better because she is at home where she belongs."
Source http://www.detnews.com/article/20111212/METRO01/112120383/1409/metro08
Detroit— Two judges in different Wayne County courtrooms sided Monday with a mother who resisted police forcing their way into her home last March to take her teenage daughter during a dispute with a Child Protective Services worker over medications.
A Family Court judge Monday afternoon accepted positive medical and education reports, and over the objections of an assistant state attorney general representing the Department of Health and Human Services, dismissed jurisdiction that had for nine months come between now 14-year-old Arianna Godboldo and her family.
Earlier Monday, a Wayne County Circuit judge refused to reinstate criminal charges, dismissed in August by a 36th District Court judge, that alleged the mother, Maryanne Godboldo, illegally resisted and assaulted police by allegedly firing a shot at them.
Family members hugged and issued thanks to the judges in both courtrooms, but authorities aren't done pursuing the Godboldos.
Wayne County Prosecutor Kym Worthy's office issued a statement Monday, vowing to make a third appeal to reinstate criminal charges.
And, Family Court Judge Lynne Pierce told Assistant Attorney General Deborah Carley, who complained it appears the girl has never received anything other than homeschooling her entire life, she is not barred from pursuing criminal truancy charges if she feels the parents are flouting state law that required the education of children.
"There may be some more evaluation to be done, but I don't see any more need of this court's continued involvement," Pierce said.
Wayne County Circuit Judge Gregory Bill ruled in the morning against claims by the prosecutor that 36th District Judge Ronald Giles committed judicial error in August when he threw out the criminal charges. Bill said Giles was correct in concluding there was insufficient evidence to order Godboldo to trial.
"It is clear to me that he (Giles) doesn't think the defendant shot at anybody," Bill said, concluding if a shot was fired inside the house, it was fired at the ceiling and perhaps not by the mother.
"Did the child get a hold of the gun? I don't know," Bill said. "There are so many statements that are conflicting evidence, and Judge Giles went out of his way to allow the prosecutor to clear this up."
Godboldo's lawyers have said all along this was about parental rights to make medical decisions on behalf of their children, and the government abused its authority in obtaining an order to take the child without a court hearing. They also said the improper action created a conflict with police that resulted in criminal charges.
"It is absurd," Godboldo lawyer Byron Pitts said about the possibility of another appeal. "Four different judges have said they believe this family did nothing wrong. This includes another District Court judge, Judge (Paula) Humphries, who ruled earlier on some matters. It has been clear to these judges that this all stems from one overzealous caseworker, and continued appeals now border on persecution."
Acting on a call from Wayne County Child Protective Services worker Mia Wenk — who told police she had obtained an order to remove the child on a claim of medical neglect — Detroit police officers on March 24 accused her of firing a handgun at them through a plaster wall after she refused to let them inside. It took hours to talk Godboldo out of the house. She was jailed for several days until her release on bond, and her daughter was held in a state psychiatric facility for almost two months.
Godboldo was charged with resisting and assaulting police, as well as use of a firearm in the commission of a felony. Giles tossed out the charges because he said the order used by police as authority to enter the house was invalid. It was never authorized by a judge, but had a rubber stamp signature. Police also testified they don't normally enforce civil court orders, but they had been told by the protective services worker it was a criminal warrant.
Bill said his opinion should not be considered as a criticism of Detroit police, but he raised questions about the behavior of the social worker, whom he described as "young." Bill hinted Wenk was impatient, filled out a legal order that was woefully inadequate, broke with established policy by calling 911 to have Detroit police enforce it rather then confront the woman herself, and then misrepresented the meaning of the order to police.
Pierce had ruled in September against the government's claims the mother had committed medical abuse by withholding a controversial anti-psychotic medication. The girl was being treated for a sudden onset of psychotic behavior the mother believes was caused by a bad reaction to immunizations.
Pierce determined Godboldo was within her rights to terminate the voluntary treatment program. The judge ordered the girl returned to the mother's home Sept. 29. A hearing to finalize the juvenile case also is scheduled for later Monday.
Godboldo said Monday she and her daughter had a difficult Sunday night because of heightened anxiety over the coming hearing. She said she hopes authorities will this time accept a judge's assessment of the situation and not appeal again.
"I hope they understand they are affecting people's lives," she said. "They should know of the damage they have done to my daughter because they broke the law."
Godboldo said her daughter had been doing better, but she was continuing to be home schooled because psychiatric troubles continue that she attributes to "effects from the immunizations." She said the girl, who wears a prosthetic leg, continues to enjoy studying dance and music, and playing her conga drums.
"She is coming along," Godboldo said. "She is doing better because she is at home where she belongs."
Source http://www.detnews.com/article/20111212/METRO01/112120383/1409/metro08
Sunday, November 27, 2011
Obese Third Grader Taken From Mom, Placed in Foster Care
A Cleveland third grader who weighed more than 200 pounds was taken from his mother after officials reportedly said she did not do enough to help the boy, who suffered from a weight-related health issue, to lose weight.
“They are trying to make it seem like I am unfit, like I don’t love my child,” the boy’s mother, who was not identified, told the Cleveland Plain Dealer. “It’s a lifestyle change and they are trying to make it seem like I am not embracing that. It is very hard, but I am trying.”
Officials first became aware of the boy’s weight after his mother took him to the hospital last year while he was having breathing problems, the newspaper reported. The child was diagnosed with sleep apnea and began to be monitored by social workers while he was enrolled in a program called “Healthy Kids, Healthy Weight” at the Rainbow Babies & Children’s Hospital.
The boy lost a few pounds, but recently began to gain some back, the Cleveland Plain Dealer reported. At that point, the Department of Children and Family Services asked a juvenile court for custody of the boy, citing his soaring weight as a form of medical neglect, according to the newspaper.
Taking obese children from their families has become a topic of intense debate over the past year after one high-profile pediatric obesity expert made controversial comments in the Journal of the American Medical Association advocating the practice in acute cases.
“In severe instances of childhood obesity, removal from the home may be justifiable, from a legal standpoint, because of imminent health risks and the parents’ chronic failure to address medical problems,” Dr. David Ludwig co-wrote with Lindsey Murtagh, a lawyer and researcher at Harvard’s School of Public Health.
A trial is set for the boy’s ninth birthday next month to determine whether his mother will regain custody.
But one family who has been in the same position as the Ohio family told ABC News they disagreed with the practice when “Good Morning America” spoke with them in January.
“Literally, it was two months of hell. It seemed like the longest two months of my life,” mother Adela Martinez said.
Her daughter, 3-year-old Anamarie Regino, weighing 90 pounds, was taken from her parents and placed into foster care a decade ago.
Anamarie didn’t improve at all in foster care, and she was returned to her parents. The young girl was later diagnosed with a genetic predisposition.
“They say it’s for the well-being of the child, but it did more damage than any money or therapy could ever to do to fix it,” Martinez said.
Anamarie Regino, who is now a teenager, agreed.
“It’s not right, what [Dr. Ludwig] is doing, because to get better you need to be with your family, instead of being surrounded by doctors,” she said.
When told of the Regino case, Ludwig said his solution of state intervention did not always work.
“Well, state intervention is no guarantee of a good outcome, but to do nothing is also not an answer,” he said.
ABC News’ Dan Harris and Mikaela Conley contributed to this report
Source http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/health/2011/11/27/obese-third-grader-taken-from-family-placed-in-foster-care/
“They are trying to make it seem like I am unfit, like I don’t love my child,” the boy’s mother, who was not identified, told the Cleveland Plain Dealer. “It’s a lifestyle change and they are trying to make it seem like I am not embracing that. It is very hard, but I am trying.”
Officials first became aware of the boy’s weight after his mother took him to the hospital last year while he was having breathing problems, the newspaper reported. The child was diagnosed with sleep apnea and began to be monitored by social workers while he was enrolled in a program called “Healthy Kids, Healthy Weight” at the Rainbow Babies & Children’s Hospital.
The boy lost a few pounds, but recently began to gain some back, the Cleveland Plain Dealer reported. At that point, the Department of Children and Family Services asked a juvenile court for custody of the boy, citing his soaring weight as a form of medical neglect, according to the newspaper.
Taking obese children from their families has become a topic of intense debate over the past year after one high-profile pediatric obesity expert made controversial comments in the Journal of the American Medical Association advocating the practice in acute cases.
“In severe instances of childhood obesity, removal from the home may be justifiable, from a legal standpoint, because of imminent health risks and the parents’ chronic failure to address medical problems,” Dr. David Ludwig co-wrote with Lindsey Murtagh, a lawyer and researcher at Harvard’s School of Public Health.
A trial is set for the boy’s ninth birthday next month to determine whether his mother will regain custody.
But one family who has been in the same position as the Ohio family told ABC News they disagreed with the practice when “Good Morning America” spoke with them in January.
“Literally, it was two months of hell. It seemed like the longest two months of my life,” mother Adela Martinez said.
Her daughter, 3-year-old Anamarie Regino, weighing 90 pounds, was taken from her parents and placed into foster care a decade ago.
Anamarie didn’t improve at all in foster care, and she was returned to her parents. The young girl was later diagnosed with a genetic predisposition.
“They say it’s for the well-being of the child, but it did more damage than any money or therapy could ever to do to fix it,” Martinez said.
Anamarie Regino, who is now a teenager, agreed.
“It’s not right, what [Dr. Ludwig] is doing, because to get better you need to be with your family, instead of being surrounded by doctors,” she said.
When told of the Regino case, Ludwig said his solution of state intervention did not always work.
“Well, state intervention is no guarantee of a good outcome, but to do nothing is also not an answer,” he said.
ABC News’ Dan Harris and Mikaela Conley contributed to this report
Source http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/health/2011/11/27/obese-third-grader-taken-from-family-placed-in-foster-care/
Sunday, November 13, 2011
Kinship Care and Child Only Cases
Blog Author Notes:
We feel that kinship care is under untilized by state CPS systems. We also find that CPS goes out of their way to make it next to impossible for relatives to get kinship placement of their family members in the system, especially if the kinship placement is not formal, no matter the ethnicity of the family. We feel the reason for this is because states get less federal funding than they would if the child is placed in a state recognized foster home or institution. The numbers have shown this to be true, time and time again. It's a shame because the one's who suffer most are the very children that states claim to be looking out for. What states are really looking out for is their bottom line, which is sad.
-----
Here is an informative link for our readers to check out concerning tribes and kinship placement:
http://www.peerta.acf.hhs.gov/uploadedFiles/Kathy%20Deserly.pdf
We feel that kinship care is under untilized by state CPS systems. We also find that CPS goes out of their way to make it next to impossible for relatives to get kinship placement of their family members in the system, especially if the kinship placement is not formal, no matter the ethnicity of the family. We feel the reason for this is because states get less federal funding than they would if the child is placed in a state recognized foster home or institution. The numbers have shown this to be true, time and time again. It's a shame because the one's who suffer most are the very children that states claim to be looking out for. What states are really looking out for is their bottom line, which is sad.
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Here is an informative link for our readers to check out concerning tribes and kinship placement:
http://www.peerta.acf.hhs.gov/uploadedFiles/Kathy%20Deserly.pdf
Tuesday, November 8, 2011
Father sues CSB in death of child - Ohio
By Ed Runyan
WARREN
Thomas Cross, the biological father of a child who died while in foster care April 2, 2009, has sued the Trumbull County Children Services Board and others.
The suit says officials failed to protect the child despite warning signs.
It says the autopsy conducted after the child’s death showed evidence of abuse pre-dating the abuse that killed her, though the Trumbull County coroner refutes that allegation.
Cross, of Garrettsville, filed the suit in federal court last week, seeking $1.2 million in damages.
Tiffany Banks Cross was 20 months old when her foster mother, Bonnie Pattinson, 30, carried her to a neighbor’s house April 2, 2009, because the girl was not breathing. The girl later was pronounced dead.
Pattinson and her family were living in a duplex on Center Street West in Champion Township at the time of the death. Pattinson later was convicted of involuntary manslaughter in the death and sentenced to nine years in prison.
In the lawsuit filed by Boardman lawyer David Engler, Cross said he warned children services that the girl might be in danger, telling children services he saw bruising on her and dog hair in her baby formula.
Children services “never responded to the father’s concern,” the suit said.
Cross’ parental rights regarding the girl were terminated, at children services’ request, Nov. 4, 2008, “despite his not being represented at final hearing of that matter, nor was there a record of his knowing and voluntary waiving of such right to representation,” the suit said.
The suit said children services also was “informed of other harmful acts perpetrated against children in the care of Bonnie Pattinson.”
Nick Kerosky, executive director of Trumbull County Children Services, said he has no comment on the lawsuit.
Dr. Humphrey Germaniuk, Trumbull County coroner, said Monday he saw nothing on the girl’s body indicating bruising or any other type of abuse other than the abuse that caused her death.
The coroner ruled that the girl died of asphyxiation, and a county prosecutor said there were marks on the child’s neck consistent with the rings Pattinson was wearing.
In the lawsuit, Cross said the coroner saw “multiple abrasions and contusions upon the infant that were consistent with a pattern of abuse dating before the actual horrific beating that resulted in the child’s death.”
The suit says children services showed “deliberate indifference to [Pattinson’s] abusive nature.”
The suit also names as defendants the Trumbull County commissioners, who appoint members of the children services board of trustees, and Pattinson.
Source http://www.vindy.com/news/2011/nov/08/father-sues-csb-in-death-of-child/
WARREN
Thomas Cross, the biological father of a child who died while in foster care April 2, 2009, has sued the Trumbull County Children Services Board and others.
The suit says officials failed to protect the child despite warning signs.
It says the autopsy conducted after the child’s death showed evidence of abuse pre-dating the abuse that killed her, though the Trumbull County coroner refutes that allegation.
Cross, of Garrettsville, filed the suit in federal court last week, seeking $1.2 million in damages.
Tiffany Banks Cross was 20 months old when her foster mother, Bonnie Pattinson, 30, carried her to a neighbor’s house April 2, 2009, because the girl was not breathing. The girl later was pronounced dead.
Pattinson and her family were living in a duplex on Center Street West in Champion Township at the time of the death. Pattinson later was convicted of involuntary manslaughter in the death and sentenced to nine years in prison.
In the lawsuit filed by Boardman lawyer David Engler, Cross said he warned children services that the girl might be in danger, telling children services he saw bruising on her and dog hair in her baby formula.
Children services “never responded to the father’s concern,” the suit said.
Cross’ parental rights regarding the girl were terminated, at children services’ request, Nov. 4, 2008, “despite his not being represented at final hearing of that matter, nor was there a record of his knowing and voluntary waiving of such right to representation,” the suit said.
The suit said children services also was “informed of other harmful acts perpetrated against children in the care of Bonnie Pattinson.”
Nick Kerosky, executive director of Trumbull County Children Services, said he has no comment on the lawsuit.
Dr. Humphrey Germaniuk, Trumbull County coroner, said Monday he saw nothing on the girl’s body indicating bruising or any other type of abuse other than the abuse that caused her death.
The coroner ruled that the girl died of asphyxiation, and a county prosecutor said there were marks on the child’s neck consistent with the rings Pattinson was wearing.
In the lawsuit, Cross said the coroner saw “multiple abrasions and contusions upon the infant that were consistent with a pattern of abuse dating before the actual horrific beating that resulted in the child’s death.”
The suit says children services showed “deliberate indifference to [Pattinson’s] abusive nature.”
The suit also names as defendants the Trumbull County commissioners, who appoint members of the children services board of trustees, and Pattinson.
Source http://www.vindy.com/news/2011/nov/08/father-sues-csb-in-death-of-child/
Monday, October 31, 2011
Title IV-D Federal Funding and ZERO Accountability
Blog authors note:
The below talks about federal money and divorcing parents. The same scenario accounts for IV-E funding involving children who are removed by CPS.
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Various Fathers, Mothers, and former father-PI's have told me that for every child placed in Foster Care, the States receive between $4,000-6,000 (per month) that the child remains under the State's foster care / Replacement Parent Protection Plan #1 (RPPP-1). The States also receive a similar amount for each child placed in adoption, or RPPP-2. And since the Majority of the Money that the State receives from the Feds does NOT go to the Replacement Parent, but rather to the State, there is a Financial Incentive for the States to place as many children as possible in one of their two Replacement Parent Protection Plans: and for this reason, THAT is exactly what is going on -- in Many cases -- with little or no justification.
My understanding is that the States receive from two-thirds to three-fourths of the Money, and the other 1/3 to 1/4 goes to RPPP-1 or RPPP-2. Therefore, the more children who are taken away from their parents, the More Money the States receive to feed their growing Monster.
See the Links below for more on how Title IV-D Federal Funding of Child Support Services, Child Protective Services, and Family Courts has turned a natural tendency to obtain More Money and Power and what it can purchase for me and my family, into a Nightmare for Divorcing Parents: and especially those who Don't Want to share the Kids, but instead to nitpick and lie about the other parent and seek Sole Legal Custody. This has given birth to Monster-Gov: with an insatiable appetite for More Children and Parents, and All their Assets: and a Free for All for state and private licensed "clinical" social workers, Family Law attorneys, psychologists, marriage and family therapists, and last but not least, State and local budgets.
Go to this link, http://www.earthage.org/familycourtcrooks/title_iv-d-federal-funding.htm, and there are several other links that explain all of this very well.
The below talks about federal money and divorcing parents. The same scenario accounts for IV-E funding involving children who are removed by CPS.
-----
Various Fathers, Mothers, and former father-PI's have told me that for every child placed in Foster Care, the States receive between $4,000-6,000 (per month) that the child remains under the State's foster care / Replacement Parent Protection Plan #1 (RPPP-1). The States also receive a similar amount for each child placed in adoption, or RPPP-2. And since the Majority of the Money that the State receives from the Feds does NOT go to the Replacement Parent, but rather to the State, there is a Financial Incentive for the States to place as many children as possible in one of their two Replacement Parent Protection Plans: and for this reason, THAT is exactly what is going on -- in Many cases -- with little or no justification.
My understanding is that the States receive from two-thirds to three-fourths of the Money, and the other 1/3 to 1/4 goes to RPPP-1 or RPPP-2. Therefore, the more children who are taken away from their parents, the More Money the States receive to feed their growing Monster.
See the Links below for more on how Title IV-D Federal Funding of Child Support Services, Child Protective Services, and Family Courts has turned a natural tendency to obtain More Money and Power and what it can purchase for me and my family, into a Nightmare for Divorcing Parents: and especially those who Don't Want to share the Kids, but instead to nitpick and lie about the other parent and seek Sole Legal Custody. This has given birth to Monster-Gov: with an insatiable appetite for More Children and Parents, and All their Assets: and a Free for All for state and private licensed "clinical" social workers, Family Law attorneys, psychologists, marriage and family therapists, and last but not least, State and local budgets.
Go to this link, http://www.earthage.org/familycourtcrooks/title_iv-d-federal-funding.htm, and there are several other links that explain all of this very well.
Monday, October 24, 2011
Grandma: Boy in four foster homes in 14 months
By Rita Price
The Columbus Dispatch Monday October 24, 2011 6:01 AM
The weekly phone conversations are eagerly awaited but rarely make her feel better.
“I hear a defeated little boy,” Mary Ann O’Garro said.
Her grandson often says he wishes he were there, in Washington state, instead of at another new place, O’Garro said. The 8-year-old’s calls have come from many phone numbers.
Franklin County Children Services brought the troubled boy back to Franklin County last year after denying Lenford and Mary Ann O’Garro’s request for in-patient treatment near their home in the Seattle area, where they could visit and work with the child’s doctors.
Their grandson had been placed with them in 2008, a little less than a year after police discovered him beaten, burned and tortured while living with his mother — Mr. O’Garro’s daughter — in a suspected house of prostitution on Columbus’ North Side.
Months of love and therapy hadn’t managed to curb his bizarre and dangerous behavior, the O'Garros and Washington therapists said, so they wanted to try hospitalization.
Children Services disagreed. The agency’s former chief said he thought the boy could be better served, and stabilized, in a foster home here with people trained to support his therapy. But after 14 months back in Franklin County, the boy has lived in four foster homes in three school districts, his grandparents say.
Add in those who provide periodic respite for the foster parents, and the child probably has been in at least 10 homes, Mrs. O’Garro said. “In our minds, there’s no way this could not have damaged him further. He was already traumatized, then he was ripped from our house, and now he’s just bouncing around.”
Because the boy might have been sexually abused, The Dispatch is not naming him.
Chip Spinning, who recently took over as Children Services executive director after Eric Fenner’s retirement, said in an email that no one wants the boy to experience more trauma. But officials still think he should be cared for in a specially trained foster home instead of at an institution. He said the child is making progress and will receive “all recommended services to enable continued progress.”
The moves are unfortunate but happen for a variety of reasons in the child-welfare system, Spinning said. He said he couldn’t share the specifics.
Mrs. O’Garro said it’s hard to be hopeful. She said she has heard various reasons for the boy’s change of placement, including foster parents’ moving, an allegation of abuse against a foster provider, and the child’s intensive needs.
“I have not, to date, ever seen a single document that says he’s been stabilized,” she said. "His level of care has continued to increase. He’s been up to six psychotropic drugs.”
Children Services has acknowledged numerous mistakes in the case, starting with a failure to inform the O’Garros of the extent of the child’s abuse — and his likely need for psychological help — after he was placed with them.
The grandparents say they needed an attorney to get the agency to pay for the child’s initial treatment in Washington. The O’Garros have health insurance, but it isn’t sufficient to cover the expensive mental-health services.
After a review in late 2009, the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services cited the agency for its handling of the case and ordered a plan for preventing future violations. Two employees were disciplined as a result of the agency’s internal investigation.
Mrs. O’Garro said she doesn’t know whether Children Services wants the child to return to his mother, to them or to be adopted.
Agency attorneys, a therapist and the child’s court-appointed guardian agreed last week that the boy’s mother, who has been released from prison, could have at least one supervised visit.
“He hasn’t seen her in nearly four years, since she was put in the police car and he was taken in an ambulance,” Mrs. O’Garro said. “That’s his last memory of her.”
The grandparents still struggle with their decision to surrender custody, a move that ultimately allowed Children Services to bring their grandson to Columbus last year. Their attorney, Susan Eisenman, has said the O’Garros made that difficult choice because they couldn’t pay for the treatment he needed and because they hoped the agency would approve a nearby Washington facility.
Instead, they had to put him on a plane.
Mrs. O’Garro cries when she thinks about all the boy has been through. Had he gone to a treatment center, “We think he’d be home with us,” she said. “All we can do now is just hope something positive happens.”
Source http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2011/10/24/grandma-boy-in-four-fosterhomes-in14months.html
The Columbus Dispatch Monday October 24, 2011 6:01 AM
The weekly phone conversations are eagerly awaited but rarely make her feel better.
“I hear a defeated little boy,” Mary Ann O’Garro said.
Her grandson often says he wishes he were there, in Washington state, instead of at another new place, O’Garro said. The 8-year-old’s calls have come from many phone numbers.
Franklin County Children Services brought the troubled boy back to Franklin County last year after denying Lenford and Mary Ann O’Garro’s request for in-patient treatment near their home in the Seattle area, where they could visit and work with the child’s doctors.
Their grandson had been placed with them in 2008, a little less than a year after police discovered him beaten, burned and tortured while living with his mother — Mr. O’Garro’s daughter — in a suspected house of prostitution on Columbus’ North Side.
Months of love and therapy hadn’t managed to curb his bizarre and dangerous behavior, the O'Garros and Washington therapists said, so they wanted to try hospitalization.
Children Services disagreed. The agency’s former chief said he thought the boy could be better served, and stabilized, in a foster home here with people trained to support his therapy. But after 14 months back in Franklin County, the boy has lived in four foster homes in three school districts, his grandparents say.
Add in those who provide periodic respite for the foster parents, and the child probably has been in at least 10 homes, Mrs. O’Garro said. “In our minds, there’s no way this could not have damaged him further. He was already traumatized, then he was ripped from our house, and now he’s just bouncing around.”
Because the boy might have been sexually abused, The Dispatch is not naming him.
Chip Spinning, who recently took over as Children Services executive director after Eric Fenner’s retirement, said in an email that no one wants the boy to experience more trauma. But officials still think he should be cared for in a specially trained foster home instead of at an institution. He said the child is making progress and will receive “all recommended services to enable continued progress.”
The moves are unfortunate but happen for a variety of reasons in the child-welfare system, Spinning said. He said he couldn’t share the specifics.
Mrs. O’Garro said it’s hard to be hopeful. She said she has heard various reasons for the boy’s change of placement, including foster parents’ moving, an allegation of abuse against a foster provider, and the child’s intensive needs.
“I have not, to date, ever seen a single document that says he’s been stabilized,” she said. "His level of care has continued to increase. He’s been up to six psychotropic drugs.”
Children Services has acknowledged numerous mistakes in the case, starting with a failure to inform the O’Garros of the extent of the child’s abuse — and his likely need for psychological help — after he was placed with them.
The grandparents say they needed an attorney to get the agency to pay for the child’s initial treatment in Washington. The O’Garros have health insurance, but it isn’t sufficient to cover the expensive mental-health services.
After a review in late 2009, the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services cited the agency for its handling of the case and ordered a plan for preventing future violations. Two employees were disciplined as a result of the agency’s internal investigation.
Mrs. O’Garro said she doesn’t know whether Children Services wants the child to return to his mother, to them or to be adopted.
Agency attorneys, a therapist and the child’s court-appointed guardian agreed last week that the boy’s mother, who has been released from prison, could have at least one supervised visit.
“He hasn’t seen her in nearly four years, since she was put in the police car and he was taken in an ambulance,” Mrs. O’Garro said. “That’s his last memory of her.”
The grandparents still struggle with their decision to surrender custody, a move that ultimately allowed Children Services to bring their grandson to Columbus last year. Their attorney, Susan Eisenman, has said the O’Garros made that difficult choice because they couldn’t pay for the treatment he needed and because they hoped the agency would approve a nearby Washington facility.
Instead, they had to put him on a plane.
Mrs. O’Garro cries when she thinks about all the boy has been through. Had he gone to a treatment center, “We think he’d be home with us,” she said. “All we can do now is just hope something positive happens.”
Source http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2011/10/24/grandma-boy-in-four-fosterhomes-in14months.html
Saturday, August 27, 2011
Michigan CPS and Failure To Prevent Injury
In the trial court, the judge ordered that the rights of the baby’s mother and father be terminated. The parents appealed the case to the Michigan Court of Appeals. They argued that there is no evidence against either of them that they were the perpetrator of any child abuse, and therefore the child should not be taken from them. However, the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling, stating that there need be no “definitive evidence regarding the identity of the perpetrator, where the evidence does show that the respondent or respondents must either have caused or failed to prevent the child’s injuries.” This ruling is one step closer to strict liability for unexplained infant injuries in Michigan. According to the Court of Appeals, the caretaking parent must have caused the injury, or he or she must have failed to prevent the injury. According to the Court of Appeals, either of these situations offer sufficient grounds for a judge to terminate a parent’s parental rights.
Read the entire story here.
Saturday, August 20, 2011
Sacramento judge eviscerates defendant, CPS over girl's death
By Marjie Lundstrom and Sam Stanton
sstanton@sacbee.com
Published: Saturday, Aug. 20, 2011 - 12:00 am | Page 1A
The court hearing Friday was to sentence 23-year-old Thomas Jerome Martin to prison for beating 3-year-old Valeeya Brazile to death.
But it turned into a public trial of Sacramento County's Child Protective Services, and Superior Court Judge Michael A. Savage found the agency guilty.
In a searing condemnation of CPS, the judge recounted repeated failures to save the little girl from months of beatings that eventually killed her and sent her mother and Martin, the mother's live-in boyfriend, off to prison.
"There is not the slightest evidence in this case that the protection or safety of Valeeya or her brother was ever a priority, or even a significant concern, for the agency or the caseworker charged with their protection," Savage said before he sentenced Martin to prison for the maximum 29 years to life.
Valeeya, a smiling little girl who loved pancakes and was proud of the fact that she could recognize the letter "V," was killed Feb. 5, 2008, in a Fair Oaks apartment. The child had been living with Martin, her 6-year-old brother and her mother, Mia Holmes, who is now serving 12 years.
Martin denies killing Valeeya, and as the judge and three of Valeeya's relatives spoke, he sat quietly at the defense table, yawning, shaking his head and cracking his knuckles.
Savage said the jury that convicted Martin of second-degree murder was the only official body that did anything on Valeeya's behalf.
"The evidence in this case of repeated, systematic, purposeful and brutally inflicted trauma by Mr. Martin on Valeeya is mountainous and undeniable," Savage said. "There is no doubt that this defendant routinely and unmercifully battered this absolutely defenseless 3-year-old, eventually beating her with enough force to end her life.
"And, unlike many others involved in this case, the jury was not fooled, did not shrug and did not shirk their responsibility."
Ann Edwards, director of the Department of Health and Human Services that oversees CPS, said in a statement issued Friday that Valeeya's murder "is tragic and we all mourn her loss.
"Although we cannot comment on the specifics of this case due to confidentiality laws, CPS has made significant practice improvements since 2008."
Valeeya's murder was among a series of high-profile deaths involving children whose families had been known to CPS. The mounting death toll, reported in a series of Bee stories, triggered numerous outside reviews.
Lynn Frank, Edwards' predecessor in the top job, resigned in 2009 as a scathing grand jury report was about to be released.
This month, the county announced that CPS Director Laura Coulthard was resigning under unexplained circumstances.
While CPS advocates say the agency has improved, despite budget cuts, Savage said the agency was more concerned with helping the mother than protecting Valeeya and her brother.
Savage said the social worker's "personal policy" to announce all visits contributed to CPS never discovering that Martin was living in the apartment – or using it as a haven for his marijuana-dealing business.
"With that ludicrous practice in place, the worker showed the ultimate disrespect to the one person she should have been duty bound to protect: Valeeya Brazile," Savage said.
The judge noted that in 2006, when Valeeya was 2 and sitting unrestrained in her mother's car, Holmes tried to run over a boyfriend.
"That behavior was so outrageous that CPS was given the responsibility of providing 'protection' for Valeeya and her sibling," Savage said. "At least, that's what the agency title implied.
"Based on that car assault alone, rational adults might have appropriately concluded that Mia had forever forfeited her right to act as a caretaker for Valeeya or any other child, for that manner."
Instead, CPS returned the children to Holmes after only four months. The social worker assigned to the case, Alexis Hince, protected Holmes' interests over that of the children, Savage said.
"How in the world could such a thing happen while CPS watched … ?" he asked.
"The case worker in this case testified, 'My job was to help her to get her children back, not to take her children away from her, so my job was to work with her in that goal so she didn't have to be worried she was going to lose her kids.'
"Heaven forbid that Mia Holmes would have had to have a moment's worry about losing her kids."
A 2009 Bee investigation found Hince was one of at least 68 individuals out of 969 CPS workers at the time with a criminal record. Savage said Hince made it clear that CPS knew of her convictions for welfare fraud – one while she worked at the agency. However, the judge said, Hince testified her convictions did not become a problem for her until they were reported in The Bee.
A CPS spokeswoman said Hince has not worked for the county since May 2009.
"It should go without saying that having criminals monitor criminals, especially when children are involved, begs for calamity," Savage said.
Martin sat impassively as the judge, a no-nonsense former prosecutor becoming known for his withering comments at sentencings, described how Martin had wasted his life serving as a baby sitter for Holmes, who was 20 years his senior.
"The defendant, 19 years old and unemployed, spent every day of his life devoted to playing video games, selling marijuana and becoming intoxicated," he said. "He completely escaped the notice of CPS, even though he lived in Mia's apartment every day for months on end."
Courtroom seats filled quickly Friday as five sheriff's detectives filed in and were seated among relatives for both Martin and Valeeya. Before the judge's calm, systematic deconstruction of CPS, Deputy District Attorney Rick Miller brought forward three of Valeeya's relatives to express their anger at Martin.
On one side of the courtroom, where Martin's grandmother and other family members were seated, rumblings of discontent began, and two of the five bailiffs present to keep the peace escorted two men out into the hallway, one of them shouting.
Olga Smith, the little girl's aunt, told Martin he was a "monster."
"I don't know what that little baby could have done to you to make you want to torture her on a daily basis," she said, "to make you want to throw her, to make you want to throw her in the air, to feel her heartbeat, punch her in the stomach, man, and on top of her little head.
"I don't know what would make you want do that. What could she have done to you?"
Eventually, Smith's emotions boiled over and she shouted profanities at Martin, something that often will result in expulsion from court.
The judge did not move to stop her, and Martin feigned boredom.
"It makes you angry," prosecutor Miller told The Bee. "Anybody who looks at this just gets angry."
The entire hearing took just over 30 minutes, and bailiffs escorted the emotional relatives out in groups.
Smith stopped one bailiff and told him, "Go hug that judge for me."
As she left the courtroom, with Martin still seated at the defense table, Smith called out one last message:
"Bye, monster."
Source http://www.sacbee.com/2011/08/20/3849750/sacramento-judge-eviscerates-defendant.html
sstanton@sacbee.com
Published: Saturday, Aug. 20, 2011 - 12:00 am | Page 1A
The court hearing Friday was to sentence 23-year-old Thomas Jerome Martin to prison for beating 3-year-old Valeeya Brazile to death.
But it turned into a public trial of Sacramento County's Child Protective Services, and Superior Court Judge Michael A. Savage found the agency guilty.
In a searing condemnation of CPS, the judge recounted repeated failures to save the little girl from months of beatings that eventually killed her and sent her mother and Martin, the mother's live-in boyfriend, off to prison.
"There is not the slightest evidence in this case that the protection or safety of Valeeya or her brother was ever a priority, or even a significant concern, for the agency or the caseworker charged with their protection," Savage said before he sentenced Martin to prison for the maximum 29 years to life.
Valeeya, a smiling little girl who loved pancakes and was proud of the fact that she could recognize the letter "V," was killed Feb. 5, 2008, in a Fair Oaks apartment. The child had been living with Martin, her 6-year-old brother and her mother, Mia Holmes, who is now serving 12 years.
Martin denies killing Valeeya, and as the judge and three of Valeeya's relatives spoke, he sat quietly at the defense table, yawning, shaking his head and cracking his knuckles.
Savage said the jury that convicted Martin of second-degree murder was the only official body that did anything on Valeeya's behalf.
"The evidence in this case of repeated, systematic, purposeful and brutally inflicted trauma by Mr. Martin on Valeeya is mountainous and undeniable," Savage said. "There is no doubt that this defendant routinely and unmercifully battered this absolutely defenseless 3-year-old, eventually beating her with enough force to end her life.
"And, unlike many others involved in this case, the jury was not fooled, did not shrug and did not shirk their responsibility."
Ann Edwards, director of the Department of Health and Human Services that oversees CPS, said in a statement issued Friday that Valeeya's murder "is tragic and we all mourn her loss.
"Although we cannot comment on the specifics of this case due to confidentiality laws, CPS has made significant practice improvements since 2008."
Valeeya's murder was among a series of high-profile deaths involving children whose families had been known to CPS. The mounting death toll, reported in a series of Bee stories, triggered numerous outside reviews.
Lynn Frank, Edwards' predecessor in the top job, resigned in 2009 as a scathing grand jury report was about to be released.
This month, the county announced that CPS Director Laura Coulthard was resigning under unexplained circumstances.
While CPS advocates say the agency has improved, despite budget cuts, Savage said the agency was more concerned with helping the mother than protecting Valeeya and her brother.
Savage said the social worker's "personal policy" to announce all visits contributed to CPS never discovering that Martin was living in the apartment – or using it as a haven for his marijuana-dealing business.
"With that ludicrous practice in place, the worker showed the ultimate disrespect to the one person she should have been duty bound to protect: Valeeya Brazile," Savage said.
The judge noted that in 2006, when Valeeya was 2 and sitting unrestrained in her mother's car, Holmes tried to run over a boyfriend.
"That behavior was so outrageous that CPS was given the responsibility of providing 'protection' for Valeeya and her sibling," Savage said. "At least, that's what the agency title implied.
"Based on that car assault alone, rational adults might have appropriately concluded that Mia had forever forfeited her right to act as a caretaker for Valeeya or any other child, for that manner."
Instead, CPS returned the children to Holmes after only four months. The social worker assigned to the case, Alexis Hince, protected Holmes' interests over that of the children, Savage said.
"How in the world could such a thing happen while CPS watched … ?" he asked.
"The case worker in this case testified, 'My job was to help her to get her children back, not to take her children away from her, so my job was to work with her in that goal so she didn't have to be worried she was going to lose her kids.'
"Heaven forbid that Mia Holmes would have had to have a moment's worry about losing her kids."
A 2009 Bee investigation found Hince was one of at least 68 individuals out of 969 CPS workers at the time with a criminal record. Savage said Hince made it clear that CPS knew of her convictions for welfare fraud – one while she worked at the agency. However, the judge said, Hince testified her convictions did not become a problem for her until they were reported in The Bee.
A CPS spokeswoman said Hince has not worked for the county since May 2009.
"It should go without saying that having criminals monitor criminals, especially when children are involved, begs for calamity," Savage said.
Martin sat impassively as the judge, a no-nonsense former prosecutor becoming known for his withering comments at sentencings, described how Martin had wasted his life serving as a baby sitter for Holmes, who was 20 years his senior.
"The defendant, 19 years old and unemployed, spent every day of his life devoted to playing video games, selling marijuana and becoming intoxicated," he said. "He completely escaped the notice of CPS, even though he lived in Mia's apartment every day for months on end."
Courtroom seats filled quickly Friday as five sheriff's detectives filed in and were seated among relatives for both Martin and Valeeya. Before the judge's calm, systematic deconstruction of CPS, Deputy District Attorney Rick Miller brought forward three of Valeeya's relatives to express their anger at Martin.
On one side of the courtroom, where Martin's grandmother and other family members were seated, rumblings of discontent began, and two of the five bailiffs present to keep the peace escorted two men out into the hallway, one of them shouting.
Olga Smith, the little girl's aunt, told Martin he was a "monster."
"I don't know what that little baby could have done to you to make you want to torture her on a daily basis," she said, "to make you want to throw her, to make you want to throw her in the air, to feel her heartbeat, punch her in the stomach, man, and on top of her little head.
"I don't know what would make you want do that. What could she have done to you?"
Eventually, Smith's emotions boiled over and she shouted profanities at Martin, something that often will result in expulsion from court.
The judge did not move to stop her, and Martin feigned boredom.
"It makes you angry," prosecutor Miller told The Bee. "Anybody who looks at this just gets angry."
The entire hearing took just over 30 minutes, and bailiffs escorted the emotional relatives out in groups.
Smith stopped one bailiff and told him, "Go hug that judge for me."
As she left the courtroom, with Martin still seated at the defense table, Smith called out one last message:
"Bye, monster."
Source http://www.sacbee.com/2011/08/20/3849750/sacramento-judge-eviscerates-defendant.html
Sunday, July 31, 2011
No. 97-15385. - CALABRETTA v. FLOYD - US 9th Circuit
v.
Jill FLOYD, individually and in her official capacity as a Caseworker of Yolo County Department of Social Services; Yolo County Department of Social Services; Nicholas Schwall, individually and in his official capacity with Woodland Police Department; Russell Smith, individually and in his official capacity as Chief of Police of the Woodland Police Department; Woodland Police Department, Defendants-Appellants.
No. 97-15385.
Argued and Submitted June 8, 1998 -- August 26, 1999
Before: J. CLIFFORD WALLACE, THOMAS G. NELSON and ANDREW J. KLEINFELD, Circuit Judges.
J. Scott Smith,Angelo, Kilday and Kilduff, Sacramento, California, for the defendants-appellants.Michael P. Farris, Home School Legal Defense Association, Paeonian Springs, Virginia, for the plaintiffs-appellees. Steven Bailey (briefed), Placerville, California, for the plaintiffs-appellees.David E. Gordon (briefed), Home School Legal Defense Association, Purcellville, Virginia, for the plaintiffs-appellees.Thomas R. Yanger (briefed), Deputy Attorney General, Sacramento, California, for amicus State of California Ex. Rel. Eloise Anders, Director of the California State of Social Services.Kevin T. Snider (briefed), United States Justice Foundation, Escondido, California, for amicus United States Justice Foundation and Christian Action Network.
This case involves whether a social worker and a police officer were entitled to qualified immunity, for a coerced entry into a home to investigate suspected child abuse, interrogation of a child, and strip search of a child, conducted without a search warrant and without a special exigency.
Facts.
The two individual defendants moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The district judge denied it.
Some individual called the Department of Social Services October 27, 1994, with the information that gave rise to this case. The report says that the caller was anonymous, but the report redacts names, thus it is not clear whether the caller gave her name but the Department treated her as anonymous, or whether she refused to give her name. The caller said that she was once awakened by a child screaming “No Daddy, no” at 1:30 A.M. at the Calabretta home. Then two days ago she (or someone else, possibly a Department of Social Services employee-it is not clear from the report) heard a child in the home scream “No, no, no” in the late afternoon. The caller said that the children “are school age and home studied” and that “this is an extremely religious family.”
The report was put into the in box of defendant Jill Floyd, a social worker in the Department. She checked the Department files to see whether the Calabretta family had any “priors,” or had ever been on welfare, and ascertained that they had no priors and had never been on welfare. She did not attempt to interview the person who had called in the report.
On October 31, four days after the call, the social worker went to the Calabretta home to investigate. Mrs. Calabretta, the children's mother, refused to let her in. The children were standing at the door with their mother, and the social worker noted on her report that they “were easily seen and they did not appear to be abused/neglected.”
The social worker was about to go on vacation, so she requested that someone else be assigned to the case, but the investigation had not been completed when she returned. On November 10, fourteen days after the call and ten days after the first visit, the social worker returned to the Calabretta house with a policeman. She did not tell the police dispatcher about the specific allegations, just that she needed police assistance to gain access so that she could interview the children. Officer Nicholas Schwall met the social worker at the Calabretta house, knowing nothing about the case except that he had been assigned to assist her. She told him that they had received a report of the children crying, and he understood her to mean that they might have been beaten.
The policeman knocked, Mrs. Calabretta answered, and the policeman said they were checking on the children's welfare because someone had reported children crying. Mrs. Calabretta did not open the door, and said she was uncomfortable letting them in without her husband at home. The police officer had the opinion that in any check on the welfare of children “there is an exigent circumstance” so no search warrant is needed. Mrs. Calabretta and Officer Schwall disagreed in their depositions on whether Officer Schwall told her that if she did not admit them, then he would force their way in. Appellants concede that for purposes of appeal, the entry must be treated as made without consent.
The social worker then took Mrs. Calabretta's twelve year old daughter into one room while the policeman stayed with the mother in another. The twelve year old did not remember any of the children screaming “No, Daddy, no,” but did recall that at about the date of the report, her little brother hurt himself in the backyard and screamed “no, no, no.” The social worker asked what kind of discipline the parents used, and understood the twelve year old to be saying that the parents used “a round, wooden dowel, very, very thin wooden dowel,” about “twice as big ․ as a pen.” The three year old came into the room at that point and said “I get hit with the stick too.” The twelve year old told her, according to the social worker's report, “that her parents do not discipline indiscriminately, only irreverence or disrespect.” The social worker wrote in her report “Minor is extremely religious-made continual references to the Lord and the Bible.” The social worker testified that any physical means of disciplining children “raises a red flag” for her, and “I always counsel or advise parents on other ways of discipline before they resort to corporal punishment.”
While the mother was still with the policeman in the other room, the social worker told the twelve year old to pull down the three year old girl's pants. She wanted to look at the three year old's buttocks to see whether there were marks. The twelve year old did not do so, and the three year old started crying. The mother heard her daughter crying and ran in. The twelve year old said “she wants me to take down Natalie's pants.” The social worker said “I understand you hit your children with objects,” and went on to say “It's against the California state law to hit your children with objects. And I found out that you hit your children with objects. And I need to see Natalie's bottom to see if there are bruises there.” The policeman said “I'll leave you alone to do this” and backed off. The social worker said “The rod of correction?” Mrs. Calabretta answered, “Oh, it's just a little stick,” referring to “a little Lincoln log, piece of Lincoln log roofing, nine inches long.” Mrs. Calabretta “explained the Biblical basis of its use” to the social worker. The social worker repeated “It's against California law to hit your children with objects. This is breaking the law. And I insist on seeing her bottom.” The three year old was screaming and fighting to get loose, the mother looked at the social worker to see whether she would relent, but she did not, and the mother pulled down the three year old's pants in obedience to the social worker's order.
There were no bruises or marks on the three year old's bottom. The social worker then insisted on seeing the piece of Lincoln log roofing, and Mrs. Calabretta showed it to her. The social worker then decided not to interview or examine the buttocks of any of the other children. She “had a brief conversation with the mother in which we discussed her looking into alternative forms of discipline.”
The Calabrettas sued the social worker and policeman and other defendants for damages, declaratory relief and an injunction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The defendants moved for summary judgment on grounds of qualified immunity. The district court denied the defendants' motion, and the social worker and police officer appeal.
Analysis.
We have jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals from denials of summary judgments denying qualified immunity.1 On summary judgment, “even in a qualified immunity case, we must assume the nonmoving party's version of the facts to be correct.” 2 Those facts must, of course, be established by evidence cognizable under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. In this case, although the parties disagree on some details, the disagreements are not material to the outcome. We review denial of the qualified immunity claim de novo.3
A. The coerced entry
The social worker and police officer concede that for purposes of appeal, they should be treated as having entered the Calabretta home without consent. They argue that the district court erred in holding that their nonconsensual entry required special exigency or a search warrant. Their theory is that an administrative search to protect the welfare of children does not carry these requirements, and the social worker was doing just what she was supposed to do under state administrative regulations. They claim immunity for entry into the home, interviewing the twelve year old, and strip searching the three year old.
“[G]overnment officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” 4 The right the official is alleged to have violated must have been “clearly established” in an appropriately particularized sense. “The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right. That is not to say that an official action is protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in question has previously been held unlawful, but it is to say that in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent.” 5 The “relevant question is the objective (albeit fact-specific) question whether a reasonable officer could have believed [the] warrantless search to be lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information the searching officers possessed. [The officer's] subjective beliefs about the search are irrelevant.” 6 “Specific binding precedent is not required to show that a right is clearly established for qualified immunity purposes.” 7
The facts in this case are noteworthy for the absence of emergency. The social worker and her department delayed entry into the home for fourteen days after the report, because they perceived no immediate danger of serious harm to the children. The police officer was there to back up the social worker's insistence on entry against the mother's will, not because he perceived any imminent danger of harm. The report that led to the investigation could have indicated a problem, but was not especially alarming. A child screaming “no, Daddy, no” late at night could mean that the father was abusing the child. But in a household where the father puts the children to bed, these words are often screamed at bedtime, and also in the middle of the night after a child has gotten up to go to the bathroom, get a drink of water, check the television, and enter his parents' room to say that he cannot sleep, when the father puts the child to bed the second time. The other scream, “no, no, no,” likewise may mean abuse, or may mean that a child around two is developing a normal, healthy sense of separateness of herself as an individual and perhaps does not care for her mother's choice of vegetable. The tipster's reference to religion might imply that the tip arose from religious differences between the tipster and the Calabretta family. Had the information been more alarming, had the social worker or police officer been alarmed, had there been reason to fear imminent harm to a child, this would be a different case, one to which we have no occasion to speak.
Appellants urge us to adopt a principle that “a search warrant is not required for home investigatory visits by social workers.” They claim qualified immunity on the ground that there is no clearly established principle to the contrary. The principle they urged is too broad. Anderson requires more particularized analysis, to determine whether, in these particular circumstances, notably the absence of emergency, a reasonable official would understand that they could not enter the home without consent or a search warrant.8
In our circuit, a reasonable official would have known that the law barred this entry. Any government official can be held to know that their office does not give them an unrestricted right to enter peoples' homes at will. We held in White v. Pierce County 9 , a child welfare investigation case, that “it was settled constitutional law that, absent exigent circumstances, police could not enter a dwelling without a warrant even under statutory authority where probable cause existed.” 10 The principle that government officials cannot coerce entry into people's houses without a search warrant or applicability of an established exception to the requirement of a search warrant is so well established that any reasonable officer would know it. Under White, appellants' claim, that “a search warrant is not required for home investigatory visits by social workers,” is simply not the law.
Appellants urge that White speaks only to police, not social workers. That is an invalid distinction. In the case at bar, the social worker used a police officer to intimidate the mother into opening the door. Also, there is no reason why White would be limited to one particular kind of government official. The Fourth Amendment preserves the “right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses ․” without limiting that right to one kind of government official. It is not as though all reasonable people thought any government official could enter private houses against the occupants' will, without search warrant or special exigency, and then White said that police officers could not, without speaking about social workers. Rather, everyone knew that the government could not so enter houses, and White said that principle was well established, in the context of a child abuse investigation. Appellants' argument that they be allowed qualified immunity because White did not speak expressly about social workers is of the kind that Anderson rejects, “[t]hat is not to say that an official action is protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in question has previously been held unlawful․” 11
There is a distinction between White and the case at bar, but the distinction is of no help to appellants. In White, there was a special exigency. Someone had called in a report that the seven year old had several welts on his back. The boy and his father talked to the police officer at the door, and the boy tried to show the officer his back, but the father would not allow him to. Based on the report, and the father's violent and abusive response when questioned, the officer thought that if he delayed to get a warrant, the father would injure the child or remove him from the house before the officer returned with the warrant. We held that “the deputies had probable cause to believe the child had been abused and that the child would be injured or could not be taken into custody if it were first necessary to obtain a court order.” 12
By contrast, in the case at bar, the report did not describe any evidence of physical abuse, and the social worker and police officer did not perceive any danger of injury to the children or loss of evidence if they secured a warrant. On her first visit four days after the call, ten days prior to her return with the police officer, the social worker wrote “Minors were easily seen and they did not appear to be abused/neglected.” The only reason the social worker and police officer did not seek a search warrant was that their subjective opinion was that they did not need one.
Appellants argue that Baker v. Racansky13 limits White to the principle that compliance with a constitutionally permissible state statute entitles the government officials to immunity. That is not correct. We did not limit White at all in Baker, but merely held that it did the claimants in that case no good. Baker is not on point, because it did not involve any kind of home search, and did not turn on any child welfare exception to normal search and seizure law.
In Baker, we held that social workers were entitled, in the particular circumstances of that case, to qualified immunity for their decision to take a child into protective custody. We noted that at the time, “there was no binding Ninth Circuit or Supreme Court precedent which clearly established when state officials could or could not take a child into temporary protective custody.” 14 That, of course, distinguishes Baker from the case at bar, where at the time there was binding Ninth Circuit precedent, White, which clearly established that the general law of search warrants applied to child abuse investigations. Baker also differs from the case at bar in that the investigators reasonably believed that the child was in imminent danger of abuse if they did not act. A neighbor's children reported to their mother, and to the social worker, that the child's father had sexually abused them, and one of them had a vaginal rash that corroborated the accusation. When the social workers asked the father's own child if his father did anything sexual with him, the child denied it but “started walking around the room ․ would crawl up in his chair ․ went into the corner of the room, put his head in between his legs, raised his legs up, put his arms up toward his head like this, curled up.” 15 The social workers thought the denial was false, because of the child's bizarre behavior when he made the denial, and thought that the mother would not be able to protect the child when the father was released from jail.
Appellants argue that other circuits have allowed broader qualified immunity, so the social worker and police officer could not have been expected to know that they were acting unconstitutionally. They cite Darryl H. v. Coler,16 Wildauer v. Frederick Cnty.,17 and Franz v. Lytle,18 and some out of circuit district court and state court decisions to show that there is no well-established right to privacy from inspections by social workers. It is not clear that a conflict among other circuits would create qualified immunity where clearly established law in this circuit would preclude it,19 but even if it could, these cases would not establish such an open question about coerced entry.
Darryl H. involves strip searches of children, not warrantless entries into homes, and is discussed below with respect to the strip search. Wildauer involves an entry into a home, but there was apparent consent and no express objection, no criminal aspect to the investigation, no entry of a parental home to investigate parents' treatment of their children, and no investigatory purpose. The householder had nine “foster children” living with her (apparently the children were not placed there pursuant to custody orders), and two sets of parents had complained that she would not give their children back despite the absence of any custodial claim. When the social worker appeared, the householder gave two children back and said there were two more she could not find, and invited the social worker in to help look for them. The social worker came back with a nurse because many of the children were disabled and the house looked unhygienic to the social worker, but the purpose of the second look, to which no objection was made, was to see whether the children should stay there, not to investigate any crime.
We are unable to see why appellants cite Franz v. Lytle.20 A neighbor told the police that a woman was leaving her two year old unsupervised and not changing her urine-soaked diapers. The Tenth Circuit held that the investigating police officer was not entitled to qualified immunity, for having the neighbor take off the child's diaper so that he could examine and feel the baby's vaginal area, and under the guise of investigating for sexual molestation, threatening to take the baby into protective custody to make the parents bring the baby to a hospital for further vaginal examination (which revealed no evidence of sexual molestation, a crime for which there was no evidence). The case would not have given the police officer and social worker in the case at bar any reason to think their entry into the Calabretta house and strip search of the three year old was constitutionally permissible, because to the extent that Franz was in any way analogous, the police officer lost on his qualified immunity claim.
One other circuit has spoken on facts analogous to those in the case at bar. Good v. Dauphin County Social Services,21 like our decision in White, holds that a social worker and police officer were not entitled to qualified immunity for insisting on entering her house against the mother's will to examine her child for bruises. Good holds that a search warrant or exigent circumstances, such as a need to protect a child against imminent danger of serious bodily injury, was necessary for an entry without consent, and the anonymous tip claiming bruises was in that case insufficient to establish special exigency. In our case, the anonymous tip did not even allege bruises.
Appellants also argue that the doctrine allowing certain kinds of administrative searches without warrants or special exigency applies to social workers' entries into homes for child protection. That proposition is too broad for the kind of particularized examination of conduct in particular circumstances required by Anderson. We need not decide whether in some circumstances that doctrine might apply, because it does not apply in the circumstances of this case.
The starting point for administrative searches is Camara v. Municipal Court.22 The case involved a routine municipal housing code inspection of an apartment house, yet the Court held that the Fourth Amendment requirement of a search warrant, consent, or exigent circumstances applied. The requirement of probable cause was diluted in the circumstances, so a warrant would be easy to obtain if an occupant would not let an inspector in without it, but a search warrant was necessary in the absence of special exigency or consent, despite the lack of any criminal investigatory purpose. Our analysis in White is consistent with Camara, and Camara is of no help to appellants.
Appellants argue that Wyman v. James,23 establishes that where a social worker enters a house to investigate the welfare of a child, Fourth Amendment standards do not apply. It does not. Wyman holds that the state may terminate welfare where a mother refuses to allow a social worker to visit her home to see whether the welfare money is being used in the best interests of the child for whom it is being paid. It does not hold that the social worker may enter the home despite the absence of consent or exigency. Wyman distinguishes Camara on the ground that in Wyman, “the visitation in itself is not forced or compelled.” 24 In the case at bar, by contrast, the entry into the home was forced and compelled.
New Jersey v. T.L.O.25 holds that the Fourth Amendment does apply to a school administrator search of a student's purse, but that in the special context of in-school searches, the Fourth Amendment did not require a warrant or probable cause. It has no bearing on searches of a home. Appellants would have us read T.L.O. as a blanket suspension of ordinary Fourth Amendment requirements where children are involved. The Court's opinion does not support so broad a reading. The court emphasized that it was “the school setting” that “requires some easing of the restrictions to which searches by public authorities are ordinarily subject.” 26 Of course there are occasions when Fourth Amendment restrictions on entry into homes are relaxed. We emphasize that in this case the officials entered without a warrant or consent simply because they thought they had a right to do so, and thought that the Fourth Amendment did not apply to entries into homes where children were involved. This was not a case where the officials coercing entry into the home recognized some special exigency creating imminent risk to the child. White v. Pierce County 27 establishes that a special exigency excuses a warrantless entry where the government officers have probable cause to believe that the child has been abused and that the child would be injured or could not be taken into custody if it were first necessary to obtain a court order.
Appellants also argue that the coerced entry into the home was primarily to protect the children, not investigate crime, pursuant to California regulations. It is not clear why this would excuse them from compliance with the Fourth Amendment, in light of the Camara holding that administrative inspections of buildings are “significant intrusions upon the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment,” even though not criminal, so in the absence of emergency, warrants should be obtained if consent is refused.28 We held, years before the coerced entry into the Calabretta home, that even in the context of an administrative search, “[n]owhere is the protective force of the fourth amendment more powerful than it is when the sanctity of the home is involved․ Therefore, we have been adamant in our demand that absent exigent circumstances a warrant will be required before a person's home is invaded by the authorities.” 29
Nor did the California statutes and regulations direct the social worker or police officer to coerce entry into the home without a warrant or special exigency, or suggest that no warrant was needed in that circumstance. The statutes 30 appellants cite say nothing about entering houses without consent and without search warrants. The regulations they cite require social workers to respond to various contacts in various ways, but none of the regulations cited 31 say that the social worker may force her way into a home without a search warrant in the absence of any emergency. A possibly related regulation, in the chapter on “Report of Child Abuse Investigative Procedures,” does speak to search warrants, but not at all helpfully to appellants. It says that the “child protective official” receiving a report should “consider the need for a search warrant.” 32 This administrative regulation would tend to put the social worker on notice that she might need a search warrant, not that she was exempt from any search warrant requirements. Appellants presented no evidence they did “consider the need for a search warrant.” They both imagined incorrectly that no search warrants were necessary to enter houses for child abuse investigations.
We conclude that on appellants' first issue, whether they were protected by qualified immunity regarding their coerced entry into the Calabrettas' home, the district court was right. They were not.
B. The strip search.
Appellants second issue on appeal is whether they were entitled to qualified immunity for the social worker's requiring the twelve year old to talk to her in a separate room and requiring the mother to pull down the three year old's pants. They argue that there is no authority on point in the Ninth Circuit, and the Seventh Circuit held in Darryl H. v. Coler 33 that such a visual inspection is shielded by qualified immunity. They also argue that there are so many reports of child abuse that the social workers cannot bear any additional restrictions on how they conduct their investigations. In their memorandum in support of summary judgment filed in the district court, appellants did not argue that they were entitled to qualified immunity for the interview with the twelve year old. Because this claim was not raised in the district court, it cannot be raised for the first time on appeal 34 and we have no occasion to pass on the question. The argument in the district court was limited to the proposition that the social worker violated no clearly established law in strip searching the three year old, so that is the only issue we consider.
Darryl H. is not entirely supportive of appellants' position. The strip search was conducted at the children's school, and did not involve an official takeover of the family home. The Seventh Circuit reversed a summary judgment in the social workers' favor on constitutionality of the search. The opinion says that “nude physical examination is a significant intrusion into the child's privacy” and even where the child is too young to have the same subjective sense of bodily privacy as an older child, the nude body search affects “legitimate expectations of the parents ․, protected by the fourteenth amendment, that their familial relationship will not be subject to unwarranted state intrusion.” 35 Although a warrant or probable cause was not needed, in the Seventh Circuit's view, reasonableness was under the Fourth Amendment, and there were issues of fact that precluded summary judgment regarding reasonableness. Although in Darryl H., as in the case at bar, the social worker ordered the mother to strip the child, there was a genuine issue of fact about whether the mother did so consensually or in response to coercion. Also, not much checking had been done on the validity of the tip, the children denied abuse, and there was evidence that the tipster might not be fair and objective.
Darryl H. offers some support to appellants because it held that the social workers were entitled to qualified immunity. But the strip search was not done during an unconstitutional entry into the home, and the information supporting a strip search was much stronger in Darryl H. than in the case at bar. The school principal reported “Lee H., age six, was tied up for punishment. Lee and his sister, Marlena, age seven, were thin and not allowed to eat lunch at school, and the children's clothes and bodies were dirty.” 36 The principal told the social worker that “both parents were usually angry when they came to school ․ that other students indicated Lee was tied up for punishment,” but “that bruises had never been observed on the children.” 37 Thus, in Darryl H., the social workers had substantial reason to believe that the children were malnourished, dirty, and abusively disciplined.
By contrast with Darryl H., in the case at bar the social worker had little reason to believe that the three year old was abused. The tip itself included a reference to the Calabrettas' religious views that might suggest that the tipster was motivated by religious differences. Even if the tip was entirely accurate, a benign explanation of “no, Daddy, no” and “no, no, no” was at least as likely as any punishment, let alone abusive punishment. The social worker had noted on her first visit that “Minors were easily seen and did not appear to be abused/neglected.” The twelve year old had already explained away the screaming and told the social worker that the children were not abusively disciplined. The social worker's notations refer to the religiosity of the household, but surely a family's religious views cannot justify social workers invading the household and stripping the children. The social worker plainly expressed the view to the mother that use of any object to spank a child, such as the “rod” (a nine inch Lincoln log) was illegal, and she did have reason to believe that such an object was used, but appellants have cited no authority for the proposition she was right that California law prohibits use of any object to discipline a child. The statutes we have found prohibit “cruel or inhuman” corporal punishment or injury resulting in traumatic condition.38 While some punishment with some objects might necessarily amount to cruel or inhuman punishment, a token “rod” such as a nine inch Lincoln log would not. A social worker is not entitled to sacrifice a family's privacy and dignity to her own personal views on how parents ought to discipline their children.
The Third Circuit held, in factual circumstances much more similar than Darryl H. to the case at bar, that the social workers lacked qualified immunity for strip searching small children. In Good v. Dauphin County Social Services,39 an anonymous tipster told Social Services that a seven year old girl had bruises on her body and said she got them in a “fight with her mother.” As with Calabretta, a social worker and police officer insisted on entry, claiming that they needed no search warrant to investigate child abuse.
Good reversed a summary judgment in the social worker's and police officer's favor on qualified immunity, and held that they were not entitled to qualified immunity. Even though there was no case in point, the Third Circuit held that the general proposition was clearly established that the government may not “conduct a search of a home or strip search of a person's body in the absence of consent, a valid search warrant, or exigent circumstances.” 40 Good cited a Seventh Circuit case for the proposition that “It does not require a constitutional scholar to conclude that a nude search of a thirteen-year-old child is an invasion of constitutional rights of some magnitude. More than that: it is a violation of any known principle of human dignity.” 41 Good holds that under Anderson, “a public official may not manufacture immunity by inventing exceptions to well settled doctrines for which the case law provides no support.” 42
Good distinguishes Darryl H. on the ground that in Darryl H. the social workers acted pursuant to state guidelines but they did not in Good (nor did they in the case at bar), and because “the strip search in this case came in the context of a forced entry into a residence” at about 10 P.M.43 Good held that “the propriety of the strip search cannot be isolated from the context in which it took place,” referring to the coerced entry into the home.44
The Tenth Circuit has likewise held that a police officer conducting a strip search of a small child in the context of a child abuse investigation lacked qualified immunity. Franz v. Lytle,45 discussed above, held that a police officer who insisted on looking at a two year old's vagina, and having a doctor look at it, to assure the absence of sexual abuse, lacked qualified immunity for the strip search. The Tenth Circuit rejected the officer's arguments that there was no case directly in point establishing the unconstitutionality, that this was an administrative search, and that such great latitude should be allowed for child protection, and held that a tip that the baby was going around with urine soaked diapers and unsupervised was not sufficient reason to allow this search. The Tenth Circuit said that the social interest in child protection included not only protection against child abuse, but also “the child's psychological well-being, autonomy, and relationship to the family or caretaker setting.” 46
This case is like Good, not Darryl H. The strip search cannot be separated from the context in which it took place, the coerced entry into the home. An unlawful entry or search of a home does not end when the government officials walk across the threshold. It continues as they impose their will on the residents of the home in which they have no right to be. There is not much reason to be concerned with the privacy and dignity of the three year old whose buttocks were exposed, because with children of that age ordinarily among the parental tasks is teaching them when they are not supposed to expose their buttocks. But there is a very substantial interest, which forcing the mother to pull the child's pants down invaded, in the mother's dignity and authority in relation to her own children in her own home. The strip search as well as the entry stripped the mother of this authority and dignity. The reasonable expectation of privacy of individuals in their homes includes the interests of both parents and children in not having government officials coerce entry in violation of the Fourth Amendment and humiliate the parents in front of the children. An essential aspect of the privacy of the home is the parent's and the child's interest in the privacy of their relationship with each other.
The social worker had already established that, as against the weak tip, “no, Daddy, no,” and “no, no, no,” the children did not appear to be neglected or abused, the twelve year old said that they were not, and the object with which they were disciplined was a token “rod” consisting of a nine inch Lincoln log. By the time the social worker forced the mother to pull down the child's pants, the investigation had contracted to the social worker's personal opinion that any discipline of a child with an object must be against the law, and her puzzling mention of the family's religiosity. The government's interest in the welfare of children embraces not only protecting children from physical abuse, but also protecting children's interest in the privacy and dignity of their homes and in the lawfully exercised authority of their parents.
AFFIRMED.
FOOTNOTES
1. Act Up!/Portland v. Bagley, 988 F.2d 868, 870 (9th Cir.1993).
2. Liston v. County of Riverside, 120 F.3d 965, 977 (9th Cir.1997).
3. Act Up!/Portland, 988 F.2d at 871.
4. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982).
5. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987) (internal citation omitted).
6. Id. at 641, 107 S.Ct. 3034.
7. Brady v. Gebbie, 859 F.2d 1543, 1557 (9th Cir.1988).
8. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640-41, 107 S.Ct. 3034.
9. White v. Pierce County, 797 F.2d 812 (9th Cir.1986).
10. Id. at 815.
11. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034.
12. White, 797 F.2d at 815.
13. Baker v. Racansky, 887 F.2d 183 (9th Cir.1989).
14. Id. at 187.
15. Id. at 189.
16. Darryl H. v. Coler, 801 F.2d 893 (7th Cir.1986).
17. Wildauer v. Frederick County, 993 F.2d 369 (4th Cir.1993).
18. Franz v. Lytle, 997 F.2d 784 (10th Cir.1993).
19. See Garcia v. Miera, 817 F.2d 650, 658 (10th Cir.1987).
20. Franz v. Lytle. 997 F.2d 784 (10th Cir.1993).
21. Good v. Dauphin County Social Servs., 891 F.2d 1087 (3d Cir.1989).
22. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967).
23. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 91 S.Ct. 381, 27 L.Ed.2d 408 (1971).
24. Id. at 317, 91 S.Ct. 381.
25. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 105 S.Ct. 733, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985).
26. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340, 105 S.Ct. 733.
27. White v. Pierce County, 797 F.2d 812, 815 (9th Cir.1986).
28. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534, 539-40, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967).
29. Los Angeles Police Protective League v. Gates, 907 F.2d 879, 884 (9th Cir.1990).
30. Cal. Welfare & Inst.Code §§ 16501(a) & 16208. Though appellants cite § 16208, the Code says that section was repealed.
31. DSS Regulations §§ 31-105.1, 31.105.11, 31.120.1, 31-125.2, & 31-130.2.
32. Cal. Admin. Code tit. 11, § 930.60.
33. Darryl H. v. Coler, 801 F.2d 893 (7th Cir.1986).
34. Marx v. Loral Corp., 87 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir.1996) ( “Generally, an appellate court will not consider arguments not first raised before the district court unless there were exceptional circumstances.”) (citation omitted).
35. Darryl H., 801 F.2d at 901.
36. Id. at 905.
37. Id.
38. Cal.Penal Code, tit. 1, §§ 11165.3 & 11165.4.
39. Good v. Dauphin County Social Services, 891 F.2d 1087 (3d Cir.1989).
40. Id. at 1092.
41. Id. at 1093, citing Doe v. Renfrow, 631 F.2d 91, 92-93 (7th Cir.1980).
42. Good, 891 F.2d at 1094.
43. Id. at 1096.
44. Id. at 1096, n. 6.
45. Franz v. Lytle, 997 F.2d 784 (10th Cir.1993).
46. Id. at 792-93.
KLEINFELD, Circuit Judge:
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